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In an ordinary home in Huron, South Dakota—sometime in the very early
morning hours of Sunday, April 5, 1987—a young girl was murdered in her crib.
By March of the next year, her mother, Debra Jenner, had been convicted of
second-degree murder. She was sentenced to life in prison. Although she became
eligible for parole in 2003 after Governor Janklow commuted her sentence, her
applications for discretionary parole were consistently denied. She remained
incarcerated until last year, when she was finally granted parole. This essay
embarks on a retelling of Debra Jenner’s trial, her subsequent post-conviction
proceedings, and her numerous parole hearings, including the one in which she
finally won release in September of 2021. In the process, it confronts a criminal
act so ghastly that it evades nearly every attempt to comprehend it and attempts
to assess the proper role of mercy in the criminal justice system—specifically, in
the context of applications for discretionary parole.
[M]ercy is above this scepter’d sway . . . .1
-

Shakespeare

I. INTRODUCTION
As Shakespeare has Portia articulate in The Merchant of Venice, mercy
reveals itself in two primary aspects: first, in human society, and second, in
God’s.2 First, there is mercy as an imperfect human attribute; an act of judgment
coupled with an exercise of the will in carrying out a human action directed toward
another.3 Then, there is heavenly mercy; a divine, spirit-driven, perfected mercy
directed at one or more of us.4 There is that which we render; that which we
emulate; that which we pray for; that which is demanded from us.5 Mercy is not
unknown in the law, but it is often incorporated in an offhand way, not in any kind
of systemized doctrine or framework. We mostly do it only lip service.

1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1, l. 2134, 2140-41. Shylock
rejects the grace of mercy and insists upon justice. He responds: “I crave the penalty . . . .” Id. See also
Stephen W. Sathner, Shakespeare for Lawyers – “The Quality of Mercy,” 14 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 10
(1995) (outlining Portia’s admonition and references to it in published cases).
2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
3. See Luke 6:36 (DRA) (“Be ye therefore merciful.”); Proverbs 11:17 (“A merciful man doth good
to his own soul.”); Zechariah 7:9 (“Thus saith the Lord of hosts, saying: Judge ye true judgment, and shew
ye mercy.”); Matthew 5:7 (DRA) (“Blessed are the merciful.”).
4. See Hebrews 4:16 (DRA) (“Let us go . . . to the throne of grace: that we may obtain mercy”);
Psalms 51:10 (DRA) (“I . . . have hoped in the mercy of God.”); Psalms 25:10 (EHV) (“All the paths of
the Lord are mercy.”); Ephesians 2:4 (DRA) (“God, (who is rich in mercy,) for his exceeding charity
wherewith he loved us.”). Pope Francis has said, “The message of Jesus is mercy . . . it is the Lord’s
strongest message.” Peter Stanford, The Name of God is Mercy Review – Mixed Messages from the Pope,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2016, 2:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/jan/10/pope-francis-thename-of-god-is-mercy-review.
5. Matthew 6:14 (OJB) (“if you give men mechila (pardon, forgiveness) for their chattaim (sins),
so also your Av shbaShomayim [Father in Heaven] will give selicha (forgiveness) to you.”).
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When a just sentence is pronounced, presumably, it takes account of both
retribution and an easing of it; a balancing; a sentence that blends a moiety of
mercy into the recipe. The Ancient Greeks would characterize justice as a mean
between the extremes of unrestrained retribution and unrestrained empathy. 6
Thus, for the ancients, mercy modulates justice. If this approach is correct, then
too much mercy (excessive mercy) could be as unbalanced as too little (defective
mercy).7 What we should aim for, according to Aristotle and other thinkers, is a
temperate mercy; a Goldilocks dose of the stuff—neither too much nor too little:
a moderate amount.8
But what is this treasured ingredient, exactly? Mercy is regularly praised,
frequently sought, and oftentimes pleaded, but seldom construed. What is it?

6. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. II, at 37 (A. Beresford, trans., Penguin Books
2020) (asserting that “virtues must aim at a mid-point.”); id. at 38 (explaining that virtue is “a ‘middle’
state both because it’s between two ways of being bad – [two vices] – one caused by going too far and one
caused by falling short, and also in the other sense that vices either make us fall short of or go beyond
what’s required in our feelings and our actions, while the [relevant] virtue finds and chooses the midpoint.”).
7. “The domain in question here is punishment, and the virtuous person is the person who will take
action to ensure that the right amount of punishment is inflicted.” Roger Crisp, Justice and Mercy,
PRACTICAL ETHICS (Sept. 8, 2009), http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2009/09/justice-and-mercy/.
8. See C.S. LEWIS, GOD IN THE DOCK: ESSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND ETHICS 294 (1970) (Walter
Hooper ed. 1970) (observing: “Mercy, detached from Justice, grows unmerciful.”); C.S. LEWIS, THE BOY
AND HIS HORSE 218-19 (HarperCollins 1982) (1954) (quoting Aslan, as he explained that his sentencing
of Rabadash to be transformed into a donkey represented a temporary rather than a permanent state of
existence for the condemned: “Justice shall be mixed with mercy.”). But see Theodore Eisenberg &
Stephen P. Garvey, The Merciful Capital Juror, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 165, 165 (2004) (asserting that
mercy interferes with the administration of justice if “mercy means imposing less punishment than an
offender deserves, and less than similarly-situated defendants receive.”). Professor Theodore Eisenberg
and Professor Stephen P. Garvey reframe and restate this thesis as follows: “A punishment less than that
which is deserved is an undeserved and therefore unjust punishment, albeit an unjustly lenient one.”
Eisenberg & Garvey, supra note 8, at 167. They also consider an alternative view, among others, where
justice and mercy are not enemies of each other, distinct and separate virtues. Under this view:
Both [Justice and mercy] require a form of fact-specific, as opposed to rule-based,
decision-making. They differ over the individual facts and circumstances to which
they attend. For example, one might argue that justice attends to all the facts and
circumstances of the crime and the culpability of the offender, but nothing more.
Mercy, in contrast, attends to a different set of facts. It might, for example, attend to
the character of the offender, or to the impact of the offender’s punishment on
innocent third parties, or to any other fact the natural tendency of which is to summon
our sympathy, pity, or compassion. Thus, one offender might in mercy’s name
receive a lesser sentence than an otherwise similarly-situated offender if the first
offender, but not the second, acted out of character, or if he, but not the second, is a
single father whose otherwise just punishment would impose particular hardship on
his dependents.
Id. at 169-70. Mercy, however, is typically construed more in terms of a free and unearned gift; “an act
of supererogation.” Id. at 170. If it is unearned, however, why not simply randomize its application in the
criminal justice system in order to ensure equality and fairness in its application? Barry Latzer, Mercy-A
Response to Evan J. Mandery’s Commentary, Mercy and Contrition, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 1 (2006)
(letter). Professor Barry Latzer also notes an irony if we define mercy as an unearned leniency: “It is most
needed by the prisoner who faces the harshest punishment, and least merited by the prisoner who has
committed the most atrocious crime.” Id. Logically, all of this follows, yet I know of few judges who
consciously set out to hand down unmerciful sentences, and none who would anticipate being praised for
it. See Hutchins v. Woodward, 730 F.2d 953, 954 (4th Cir. 1984) (“Judges regard themselves as
merciful.”). Given the centrality of mercy, it seems it must represent more than merely the correct
modulation of justice. It must be greater than the equivalent of tuning an automobile’s throttle.
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If it is merely a codeword for restraint, how should we mete it out?9 When
should we withhold it? What role should it play? Is it merely descriptive of a
lenient sentence? Is it present whenever a prisoner qualifies for early release and
absent whenever a prisoner does not? Is it mere sentimentality and free-flowing
empathy, or is it an authentic precept with a genuine role within the criminal
justice system?10
Not infrequently, we call upon mercy as an essential component to the
administration of justice.11 In this sense, mercy might be less like restraint and
more akin to attention, caution, and freedom from bias—that is, as an element of
judgment; an important part of all good judicial decision-making; a characteristic
in any praiseworthy verdict. Like salt, we might notice a deficiency when it is
lacking (“This meatloaf needs salt”) but never as the key form of justice (One
would never say, “Tastiness means saltiness,” or even “The true mark of a great
chef is one who knows how much salt to use”). But unlike salt, we could never
have too much of it insofar as we would never accuse a judge or a jury of excessive
impartiality. We would never characterize an unfair verdict as one suffering from
a tad too much thoughtful attention.
Whatever mercy is, it also proves difficult to locate—however construed—
within the body of the law. Both its quiddity and its position are elusive; both its
what-ness and its proper role are fleeting—but I hope to stalk mercy’s edges in the
pages which follow. I will not capture mercy. Even if I did, I would remain
uncertain about its application, though I am convinced of its essential qualities.
Or at the least I am convinced that mercy does possess a particular set of
characteristics, if not precisely what those characteristics are.
Mercy, whatever it is, is a particularly relevant inquiry framed against Debra
Sue Jenner, a mother from Huron. Her crime “shocked the town of Huron and
stands out as one of South Dakota’s most high-profile cases in recent decades.”12
Following her conviction for the brutal murder of her young daughter, she served
9. Pope John Paul II construed mercy as more than merely restraint or modulation. See John Paul
II, Dives in Misericordia, VATICAN (Nov. 30, 1980), https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paulii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_30111980_dives-in-misericordia.html [hereinafter Dives in
Misericordia] (explaining: “Not only does He speak of [mercy] and explain it by the use of comparisons
and parables, but above all He Himself makes it incarnate and personifies it. He Himself, in a certain
sense, is mercy.”) (emphasis added). He defined mercy as God Himself. See id. The Latin title to this
encyclical translates as “rich in mercy.”
10. For explorations of the virtue of mercy, see generally Lyla H. O’Driscoll, The Quality of Mercy,
21 S.J. PHIL. 229 (1983); George Rainbolt, Mercy: An Independent, Imperfect Virtue, 27 AM. PHIL. Q.
169 (1990). For analyses of mercy in the courts, see generally Andrew Brien, Mercy Within Legal Justice,
24 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 83 (1998); Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83
(1993); Mary Sigler, The Story of Justice: Retribution, Mercy, and the Role of Emotions in the Capital
Sentencing Process, 19 L. & PHIL. 339 (2000).
11. E.g., Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings Empanelled May 1988, 894 F.2d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“The difference between appealing to the district judge’s equitable discretion and appealing to some
undefined quality of judicial mercy is semantic rather than practical . . . .”); Higginbotham v. Ford Motor
Co., 540 F.2d 762, 774 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he quality of Georgia mercy is strained indeed in the wrongful
death area . . . .”).
12. John Hult, Bar Photos, Says Woman Who Killed Her Girl, ARGUS LEADER (Sept. 30, 2014, 7:43
AM),
https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/2014/09/30/bar-photos-says-woman-killedgirl/16465907/.
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time in the South Dakota prison system (first at Springfield; later at Pierre) from
1988 until 2021, when she was finally granted discretionary parole.
If there is reason to soften toward her crime, it seems, it resides in mercy,
though mercy was not necessarily lacking when she was originally sentenced to
life in prison without the possibility of parole. (Only because of a subsequent
gubernatorial commutation was she even eligible for parole.) If the original
sentence was just, then to insist upon softening it with mercy would be to argue
for an unjust accommodation; it would be to ask for something other than what is
just.13 Should we even speak of mercy in connection with an application for
discretionary parole? May state actors ever legitimately embody mercy? Or may
only pastors and parents demonstrate it?
As I said earlier, mercy is an elusive prey. If it is a divine attribute—and it
is—then it is not for capturing.14 It is for chasing. It is for modeling, but not
perfectly replicating. Just how we are to emulate it, and when, are demanding
dilemmas.
Debra may have merited a dose of mercy from the South Dakota Board of
Pardons and Paroles in September of 2021 if only on account of the length of the
sentence she had already served. Perhaps the length of her incarceration, which
had already unspooled for her, naturally generated a splash of mercy where,
previously, it would have been unfitting. Indeed, perhaps genuine justice required
an additional dose of the mercy stuff at that particular juncture in Debra’s legal
life. Perhaps not. Perhaps she had simply served enough time, given the relevant
factors to be considered in connection with an application for discretionary parole,
none of which include any reference to mercy as such.15
Before we can arrive at our own judgment concerning her release, we must
obtain sufficient knowledge of her and her crime. No sentence is seen as just—
even if it happens to be correct—if it is rendered hastily, without reflection, or
lacking in foundation. Perhaps in carefully examining Debra’s legal life, we might
glimpse the proper role of mercy in the judicial machinery which held her. So, it
is to her now that we should turn. But we should be prepared to encounter a
stumbling block in our assessment of Debra’s parole status, which sits at the very
center of justice in the realm of criminal justice; the act for which she is being
punished. That act is indecipherable. It is inconceivable.
I will contend that Debra must be met with mercy despite the
incomprehensibility of what she did—both to us and to her. We cannot imagine
her crime, and she herself cannot recall it; she cannot remember it. So, the very
act with which we are to configure a judgment is opaque. And mercy itself is

13. If both justice and mercy are virtues, can they really be in conflict? “[I]f we adopt the premises
of virtue ethics as described by Aristotle, we would conclude that mercy lies between the vices of cruelty
and uncaring, while justice lies between the vices of cruelty and softness.” Austin Cline, Mercy vs. Justice:
A Clash of Virtues, LEARN RELIGIONS (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.learnreligions.com/argument-fromjustice-for-existence-of-god-248257.
14. See REDEMPTORIST FATHERS, MANUAL OF THE PURGATORIAN SOCIETY 17 (1916) (stating,
“The judgments of God are very different from the judgments of men.”).
15. See infra Part II(H) (quoting SDCL § 24-13-7 (2013)).
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difficult to pin down, and thus, it presents us with an indecipherability of its own.
We seem to agree that mercy is important; we seem even to know something of
its intrinsic qualities even if we bumble a bit in expressing them well. And, it
seems, as lawyers, if we are called upon to assist in its application, we are also
called upon to decipher it as best we can.
Ultimately, I am afraid, the correct application of mercy must be left to shaper
minds than mine. But I will return to mercy; how it ought to be measured out or
withheld after outlining how Debra arrived at where she was in the fall of 2021
when she was finally granted parole. The quality of mercy and its application, I
contend, is especially problematic when the nature of the criminal’s conduct lies
beyond our powers of imagination or comprehension. Debra’s case is a difficult
one, but it is not beyond our faculties to wrestle with it. Indeed, we must. With
her case, we must be prepared to face the reaction her crime invokes. It is one of
utter inconceivability. And it is this inconceivability, I believe, that might render
mute and unsure the proper dose of mercy which ought to be applied. It is, to
some degree, the chief stumbling block she encountered in so many unfavorable
applications for parole over the years.
Mercy is always an elusive virtue. It is especially elusive in the context of
Debra, but, it seems, we are nevertheless commanded to construe it and apply it,
even in difficult cases. Especially, perhaps, in the difficult cases.
II. DISCUSSION
A. DEBRA SUE JENNER
An only child, Debra Sue Jenner was born and raised in Huron, South
Dakota.16 So was her first husband and father of her children, Lynn Jenner. They
had been high school sweethearts and had been married six years before having
their first child, a son they named Stuart Jenner, born in 1982.17 A daughter, Abby
Lynn Jenner, followed the next year. Abby was lactose intolerant and sometimes
had difficulty sleeping.18 In other respects, the Jenner family life, from all
appearances, was entirely predictable, routine, and unremarkable. Their home at
1137 Frank Avenue S.E. was commonplace, their quotidian lives, plain. Prior to
April of 1987, Debra had never had contact with law enforcement for any reason.
Debra was an agri-research technician for Pioneer Hybrid International with
an associate degree, while Lynn was a carpenter.19 He worked at Farmer’s
Cashway Lumber.20 Both of them taught Sunday school at the Huron Wesleyan
Church. Lynn was the Sunday school superintendent; Debra taught preschool

16. Steve Young, Would DNA Free Mom Convicted of Murder?, ARGUS LEADER, Aug. 6, 2000, at
A4.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
State v. Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710, 711 (S.D. 1990).
Appellee’s Brief App. at 56-57, Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710 (No. 16240).
Id. at 57.
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Sunday school for several years.21 Debra was also the church pianist, head of the
youth choir, and director of the church’s music department.22 From all outward
appearances, the Jenner family was ordinary in every respect.
B. APRIL OF 1987
In the spring of 1987, Abby was three and a half years old. She never reached
her fourth birthday. Instead, she met a horrific, maniacal end at the hands of her
mother. The event is as gruesome and horrific as it is inexplicable. It is base,
cruel, and deeply disquieting.
April 3, 1987, was a Friday. That night, Abby woke up, and her parents
attended to her sleeplessness.23 The next day—Saturday, April 4—the family
went on a short trip. Abby was still out of sorts, soiling her pants twice.24 That
evening, the Jenners went out with the Van Laeckens for dinner and a movie.25
The two couples watched the movie Hoosiers, about a small-town basketball
team’s trip to the state championships.26 Babysitters had supervised both the
Jenner’s and the Van Laecken’s children at the Jenner residence.27 After the
movie, the babysitters went home, Debra checked on the children, turned on the
nightlight, and she and Lynn went to bed.28
The next morning was April 5. Son Stuart was the first to rise.29 Lynn got
up to fix him breakfast while his son curled up next to his mother to watch
television in the couple’s bedroom.30 Debra rose from the bed to start getting
herself and her children ready for church.31 After Lynn finished showering, he
entered Abby’s room to rouse her.32 He opened her bedroom shade.33 The
sunlight flooded in. He turned to her lifeless body on her bed and approached it.34
The clock would have shown that it was just a few minutes before 9:00 a.m. 35
From this point on, I find it difficult to improve upon the narration contained
within Justice Frank E. Henderson’s majority opinion in the direct appeal of
Debra’s conviction. Justice Henderson’s text includes an accurate description of
the initial investigations of Abby’s death by the Huron Police Department, the
Beadle County Sheriff’s Office, and the State’s Division of Criminal
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Young, supra note 16, at 4A.
Id.
Jenner, 451 N.W.2d at 711-15.
Id.
Appellant’s Replacement Brief at 2-3, Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710 (No. 16211).
Id. at 3; HOOSIERS (Orion Pictures 1986).
Appellant’s Replacement Brief, supra note 25, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710, 712 (S.D. 1990).
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Investigation. Accordingly, I will present it here, unedited. Following, then, is
Justice Henderson’s description of what transpired as Lynn approached his
daughter’s unmoving body:
He found her in bed, lying totally still, with her mouth full of
blood. He screamed, whereupon Debra came over from the
master bedroom, approximately twenty feet away. Debra sat on
the edge of Abby’s bed and touched her. Abby’s body was cold,
her eyes dilated. Debra telephoned “911” at 8:59 a.m., gave her
address, then relating that a three year old girl was there, with
blood and “organs” coming out of her mouth. Debra’s tone of
voice, during this conversation, was very loud. An ambulance was
dispatched.
Before the ambulance arrived, at 9:05 a.m., Debra made an
additional telephone call to Doctor Cynthia Kortum, M.D., her
family doctor, during which her tone of voice was quite calm. She
informed Dr. Kortum, matter of factly, that Abby had died during
the night and requested an autopsy. Debra, in the six minutes
between her 911 call and the ambulance’s arrival, also telephoned
her parents, Bruce Schafer and Janet Schafer, and her pastor,
Darrel Wagner. At the time the ambulance arrived, she was
engaged in still another call, to her friends, the Brink family. The
ambulance, her parents, and officer William Ehlers, of the Huron
Police Department, arrived at the Jenner home within moments of
each other. An emergency medical technician entered the Jenner
home, found no signs of life in Abby, and carried her, still
enwrapped in bloodstained bedding, out to the ambulance. The
ambulance then proceeded to the Huron Regional Medical Center.
The ambulance crew noticed numerous cuts on Abby’s body.
Later examination revealed that seventy stab wounds were
inflicted on Abby. Dr. Brad Randall, the forensic pathologist who
performed Abby’s autopsy, testified at trial that some wounds
were of a slashing type, consistent with a blade sharpened on one
edge and dull on the other. Other wounds were punctures, which
could have been made by a model airplane owned by Stuart which
was found next to the sink in the Jenners’ kitchen. In particular,
the geometry of one wound was described by Dr. Randall as
“relatively unique”, matching the model plane, as markings
around the wound corresponded to a protrusion on the back of the
plane and its rear fins. Dr. Randall characterized numerous cuts
on Abby’s arms and hands as “defensive” in nature, i.e., inflicted
as Abby, who laid on her stomach, attempted to fend off the blows.
He termed the attack a “frenzy type”, evidenced by repeated blows
with no particular target. He estimated that Abby died during the
early morning hours of April 5, 1987.
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No members of the Jenner family accompanied Abby to the
hospital. At 9:17 a.m., six minutes after delivering Abby to the
hospital, the ambulance driver, Mike Ball, returned to the Jenner
home to retrieve equipment. Ball testified that [Debra] was
talking on the telephone normally, in an utterly calm manner.
Debra and Lynn went to the hospital only after Janis LaMont, a
registered nurse, called them at home requesting information.
Once at the hospital, according to LaMont, Debra appeared
restless, and paced in the hallway. Lynn stayed in the waiting
room, head in hands. Shirley Jenner, Debra’s mother-in-law,
remarked that she wished Debra would cry. David Bender, a
hospital maintenance worker, spoke to Shirley, who was, herself,
a hospital worker, for about 20 minutes. At one point, Shirley
Jenner left him to converse with Debra. He testified that he heard
Debra remark that it was a “screwed-up day”, and asked “why
couldn’t this have been a simple death?” He also heard Debra
remark, “I don’t know how the hell it happened”, in reference to
the cuts, wounds and scratches upon Abby’s lifeless body. At one
point, Debra asked Shirley who Bender was. When Shirley
identified him as a hospital maintenance worker, Debra
responded: “Oh shit.”
While at the hospital, Beadle County Sheriff Tom Beerman
(Beerman) spoke to Debra and Lynn. According to Beerman’s
testimony at trial, he asked Debra if Abby had been sick, and
Debra replied that Abby had been “hyper” for a couple of days,
that she had stayed up with Abby on Friday night (April 3, 1987),
and that Abby had soiled her pants a couple of times on Saturday
afternoon. Debra also related that she checked on Abby at
midnight Saturday night, when Abby was asleep, and did not see
her again until after Lynn found her the next morning. Debra and
Lynn, Beerman was told, then went to bed, only to be disturbed
by noise from a party next door. They arose, looked out a window,
and watched three intoxicated individuals enter a car and drive
away. Per Debra, they then returned to bed and slept until the next
morning. Lynn, who discovered Abby’s body, informed Beerman
that he went into Abby’s room to waken her for church, noticed
something wrong, turned her over onto her back, and saw blood.
He looked in Abby’s eyes and knew that she was dead.
Meanwhile, when the Jenners, mother and father of the
victim, were at the hospital, Deputy Chief Robert McQuillen
(McQuillen) and Sergeant William Ehlers (Ehlers) of the Huron
Police Department went to their home. There they found Lynn’s
father, Merlin Jenner, and Ruby Wagner, wife of the Jenners’
pastor. Examining Abby’s bedroom, they immediately noticed
that her bedding had been replaced. After Mrs. Wagner told him
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she had already cleaned the room, as she did not want the Jenners
to come home and see the mess, McQuillen told those present to
leave the room and house alone. McQuillen and Ehlers briefly
went to the hospital, and then returned to the Jenner home. They
noticed that the bedding in Abby’s room had been changed again.
McQuillen told everyone to leave. The bedding, not taken to the
hospital with Abby, was recovered that morning from defendant’s
father, Merlin Jenner, who had placed it in his car.
Huron police detective Dave Rand, Dr. Ilya Zeldes, a
forensic scientist, and Rex Riis, a criminologist from the State
Forensic Laboratory in Pierre, examined the Jenner home later
that day. They found no evidence of forced entry. Bloodstains
were discovered on the headboard of Abby’s bed, on the wall
behind the bed, on the bathroom floor, on a wall-mounted light
switch in Abby’s room and on a telephone near the kitchen.
Abby’s blood was therefore found in different parts of the Jenner
home. Abby’s mattress was turned over before they arrived, with
the bloody side facing down. A knife which was consistent with
some of Abby’s slashing wounds was in a silverware tray atop a
microwave oven near the kitchen sink. These officers removed
clothing, similar to clothes Debra claimed to have worn to bed on
the night Abby was slain, from a hamper next to a washing
machine in the basement. No identifiable fingerprints were found.
Debra and Lynn went to Merlin’s house after they left the
hospital that day. While there, Mary Brink, a family friend,
noticed that Debra washed her hands several times that morning.
When asked what the problem was, appellant responded: “I can’t
get the smell off of my hands.” Debra and Lynn eventually left
Merlin’s for Debra’s parent’s home, where Beerman reached them
by telephone, sometime after 5:00 p.m. Beerman asked them to
come down to his office to be interviewed by Jerry Lindberg
(Lindberg), a Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) agent.
Debra was interviewed by Lindberg for approximately an
hour and a half, starting at 8:30 p.m. During this interview, she
repeated much of the factual background she had earlier given to
Beerman. There was one significant difference, however, as she
told Lindberg that she did enter Abby’s room that morning just
before Lynn discovered Abby’s body, but noticed nothing
unusual. Also, according to Lindberg’s trial testimony, Debra
claimed that she could not remember whether the outside doors of
her home were locked the night Abby died. Lindberg observed
that Debra was very calm and collected during the interview.
After the Jenners left, Beerman, Riis, and Dr. Zeldes went to the
Jenner’s home, where hair and blood samples were given by the
Jenners, by consent.
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The next day, April 6, 1987, Debra offered to turn over her
class ring, which she thrice assured him had not been “scrubbed”.
As she later testified that she wore it from Saturday night, April 4,
through Sunday night, April 5, the ring, per her statements, must
have been washed at least four times while she wore it (three times
while at Merlin’s house, according to Kay Brink’s testimony, and
once, additionally, in the bathtub at her home after Lynn
discovered Abby’s body). During this conversation, she asked
Beerman why the police were not checking persons who had been
at the party next door. Beerman replied that they were being
investigated. Lynn, later that day, turned the ring over to
McQuillen and Rand, together with other personal jewelry.
Beerman telephoned Lynn Jenner, on Tuesday, April 7,
1987, and asked that he and Debra come to his office for a few
more questions. They agreed and arrived shortly after 2:00 p.m.,
accompanied by Lynn’s parents and their Pastor, Darrell Wagner.
DCI agent Lindberg spoke to them together, for five to ten
minutes, and asked them to submit to a polygraph test. Lindberg
explained that the tests were strictly voluntary, and that the
polygraph was used as an investigative tool to help eliminate or
generate suspects. Lynn readily consented to testing, and Debra
consented after being assured that her grief would not affect the
test results. The Jenners were then separated, and DCI agent Fred
DeVaney (DeVaney) presented a polygraph consent form to
Debra for signature. As she read the form, he advised her that she
did not have to take the test, and discussed the test procedure. She
signed the consent form. DeVaney then administered the
polygraph test, which lasted 90 minutes. During the test, Debra
showed no reluctance or hesitation to answer questions.
According to DeVaney’s trial testimony, Debra theorized that two
men had broken into the house and killed Abby. She opined that
it had to be two men—one to kill, and one to open doors without
getting blood on the doorknobs. Between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m.,
having finished the test, DeVaney left Debra alone in the room for
five to ten minutes, while he reviewed the polygraph charts. The
charts indicated that she had been deceptive in her responses.
DeVaney asked Lindberg to follow this up.
Lindberg then talked with Debra for 15 to 20 minutes.
During this interview, Debra admitted past problems with
physical discipline upon the deceased child, including one specific
incident where she spanked Abby with a wooden spoon so hard
that the spoon broke. She also stated that she and Lynn locked
their bedroom door at night to prevent their children from
crawling into bed with them. When asked if she hurt Abby, she
replied: “I don’t remember[,]” and “I didn’t do this, but I could
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have psyched out during the night.” When asked, outright, if she
killed Abby, she simply denied remembering it. At one point,
according to Lindberg’s trial testimony, she said: “A person could
just go click and go in and do this and clean up the mess and not
remember it.” She denied noticing any smell of blood, even after
touching Abby after Lynn found her dead, and related that she
noticed nothing unusual when she entered Abby’s room
immediately before that (at trial, Debra testified that she only
glanced at Abby, and focused entirely on the floor when passing
around the bed on the way to the closet). During this discussion,
Debra’s demeanor fluctuated between being calm and visibly
upset with great rapidity.
At 4:00 p.m., DeVaney replaced Lindberg and interviewed
Debra for another hour. She exhibited no reluctance or hesitancy
to continue the interview. According to DeVaney, Debra repeated
that she might have “psyched out” and done it, and asked him if
he was a psychologist (he was not). She also volunteered to him
that she wanted to use any means in DeVaney’s words, “to get the
truth out of her if she had done it[,]” including the use of a
psychologist or hypnosis. DeVaney testified that he left the room
at one time, and came back to find that she had gone to the
bathroom and returned while he was out. He also procured a Diet
Coke for her, after she declined an offered Coca–Cola. At
approximately 5:00 p.m., he discontinued his questioning because
he perceived that she was looking down on him after he responded
negatively to her inquiry as to whether he was a born-again
Christian. He asked her if she was willing to continue the
interview with another DCI agent, Ken Giegling (Giegling). She
agreed.
During this interview, which lasted until 9:00 p.m., Debra
told Giegling that neither her husband nor her son killed Abby.
As in the earlier interviews that day, she indicated that she could
not recall killing Abby, yet repeated that she might have “psyched
out.” According to Giegling, Debra asked his help in spurring her
memory, and offered to undergo hypnosis, take a “truth serum”,
or talk to a psychologist to that end. Debra related that, in
Giegling’s words, “from the start of all this that she has had it in
the back of her mind that she could have done this.” She also
informed him that she was afraid she had committed “this horrible
premeditated act[.]” At another point, Giegling testified, she
grabbed his hand and told him that she recalled her husband
locking the front door of her home on the night in question, a fact
that she had told nobody else (she claimed at a later suppression
hearing, and at trial, that she could not remember if this memory
concerned the night Abby died).
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DeVaney also testified that Debra described the killing
several times, as seen through Abby’s eyes. The first such account
came, according to Giegling, without any prompting: Abby was
not afraid, knew the perpetrator, trusted the person, and saw a
knife, a Chicago Cutlery knife which she had seen before. The
second time Debra reconstructed Abby’s point of view, she
indicated that her own hair was down, and Abby grabbed it.
(Analysis of hair samples taken from Abby’s hands and arms
indicated that these hairs were consistent with samples of either
Abby’s or Debra’s hair, but not Lynn’s). Debra related that a
black object was in Abby’s room at the time, and identified it as a
black model airplane which belonged to her son. When asked
where the plane was then, Debra informed Giegling that it was on
the counter in her kitchen. Giegling then left Debra and informed
the police of the model airplane and its location. They found it
exactly where Debra said it would be (this is the model plane, the
shape corresponding to wounds on Abby’s body). Up until that
point, the police had been unaware of the model plane. At the
suppression hearing and trial, Debra disputed Giegling’s account.
She testified that Giegling had simply asked if there were any
sharp toys in the house, to which she replied by identifying the
model and giving its location.
The last time Debra described events in Abby’s bedroom for
Giegling, she changed her position, stating that a man was
standing over Abby’s bed with a knife in his hand; further, that he
took the knife with him when he left.
At approximately 9:00 p.m., Giegling became concerned
with Debra’s demeanor, which had been changing throughout the
interview. He brought Lynn into the room, and Debra, as Giegling
told it, cried out, “I did it, I did it, I did it [,]” which statement her
husband then acknowledged by saying “You did it”, (Debra and
Lynn later disputed Giegling’s account on this point, by testifying
that she actually said “I did it, didn’t I?”). Debra then asked Lynn
if he helped her, to which he replied that he had not. She then
said: “If you didn’t help me how could I do this, clean up and go
outside?” No further questioning was undertaken by the police
that night.36
The police questioning had terminated following an outburst by Debra that
was so disconcerting that it led Giegling to believe she “was suffering a nervous
breakdown.”37 Giegling brought in psychologist Duane Majeres to assess Debra’s
mental state. Majeres, however, found her to be very calm and well-oriented.38
36. Id. at 712-15 (brackets in the original).
37. Id. at 729 (Sabers, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 715 (Henderson, J., majority).
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Following this psychological assessment, Debra left the Sheriff’s office at about
10:00 p.m.39 Abby’s funeral was scheduled for the next day at the Wesleyan
Church. Debra’s interrogation had continued through a family memorial service
for Abby that evening.40 Now, it was too late for the parents to attend the service.
So instead, a DCI agent and deputy sheriff dropped Debra and her husband off at
their pastor’s home.41
The next day, Debra retained attorney David Gienapp.42 The investigation
of Debra continued apace. But it was four and a half months before the state would
seek an indictment.
C. DEBRA’S INNOCENCE CAMPAIGN
Debra doggedly maintained her innocence in the months leading up to her
indictment, before her trial, following her conviction, and for years afterward. An
indicted individual—even if guilty of the offense or offenses charged—has the
absolute right to put the state to its burden of proof by pleading not guilty. Indeed,
more occurs within a criminal trial than an objective determination of the quantum
of evidence submitted and whether it meets the threshold of proving the elements
of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Pleading not guilty may have more than
mere strategic considerations. A trial can also represent a process by which the
defendant comes to understand her guilt.43 For defendants charged with offenses
such as sexual abuse of a child, insisting on a trial can represent a strategy of a
different sort—retaining the ability to insist on innocence in order to avoid or at
least mitigate an exceptionally unpleasant experience in prison where inmates
reputably treat child rapists with an exaggerated cruelty.44 In other circumstances,
a defendant may be simply psychologically unprepared to admit to guilt.45 She
may be in denial.46
Debra’s self-advocacy for her own release, however, was exceptional. Her
vociferous insistence on her innocence was almost unprecedented—to the extent
39. See Appellant’s Replacement Brief, supra note 25, at 7 (stating “Debra and Lynn arrived at the
sheriff’s office at approximately 2:00 PM . . . the entire interviewing process proceeded for seven to eight
hours.”).
40. Id. at 23.
41. Appellee’s Brief at 21, Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710 (No. 16240).
42. Id.
43. See Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 971,
972 (1992) (portraying a “client [who] was adamant about going to trial because she ‘wanted to tell her
story.’”).
44. “Sex offenders face being ostracized or targeted by other prisoners . . . .” Survive Prison as a
Sex Offender, ZOUKIS CONSULTING GRP., https://www.prisonerresource.com/prison-life/specialtactics/how-sex-offenders-survive/ (last visited Jul. 26, 2021).
45. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179,
1304 (1975) (considering “a small group of obviously guilty defendants who are psychologically incapable
of admitting their guilt.”).
46. See also, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2464, 2503 (2004) (explaining: “Offenders who falsely believe they are innocent probably
overestimate their chances of acquittal at trial because they think juries will share their own distorted
perspectives.”).
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that even after she eventually admitted guilt, some of her supporters believed that
she had made a false confession, so convincingly had she maintained her
innocence up until that point. Moreover, Debra not only maintained her
innocence, she spun tales about the purportedly real culprit or culprits while
conducting a well-orchestrated—and financially successful—campaign to raise
funds for her defense. Presumably, the real murderer was a bad actor attending or
associated with the noisy next-door neighbor’s party the night Abby was killed.
A website was maintained to solicit donations in order to prove her
innocence. Text on the website suggested corruption on the part of the police and
judges.47 Debra was responsible for invective “directed at the circuit judge who
presided over her case, over the prosecutors, the police, basically alleging at every
opportunity that she had been railroaded.”48 Debra’s parents have testified that
Debra’s legal bills as of 2003 totaled “as much as $200,000,” which they paid.49
They explained that the amounts raised by the website were “a drop in the
bucket.”50 The website itself indicated that approximately $35,000 had been
raised.51
D. TRIAL AND APPEAL
1. Trial
Abby had died sometime late Saturday or early Sunday, April 5. A brief
account appeared in the Huron Daily Plainsman on Monday.52 It said only that
the death of three-and-one-half-year-old Abby, the daughter of Lynn and Debra,
was being investigated.53 Initially, Beerman refused to elaborate or even confirm
47. Amended Verified Complaint Ex. 1 at 3, Jenner v. Nikolas, No. 4:14-CV-04147-KES, 2015 WL
4600352 (D.S.D. 2015).
48. Murdering Mom Asks for Parole Again, SIOUX CITY J. (Dec. 21, 2005),
https://siouxcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/murdering-mom-asks-for-paroleagain/article_81602fd4-3565-53a7-8547-aef0053d603d.html (quoting Mark Barnett).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Death of Huron Girl Investigated, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Apr. 6, 1987, at 1. The account
ran 118 words. Id. Its full text is printed below:
Local and state law enforcement officials are investigating the weekend death of
Abby Lynn Jenner, 3½-year-old daughter of Lynn and Debra Jenner, who live at 1137
Frank Ave. S.E.
Beadle County Sheriff Tom Beerman and Deputy Police Chief Robert
McQuillen refused to elaborate on the case.
“It involves a 3½-year-old girl and the investigation is continuing,” Beerman
said, adding he would make no further comments on the investigation.
Beerman said the sheriff’s office, police department and state Division of
Criminal Investigation are involved in the case.
Beerman did say that an autopsy was conducted Sunday night in Sioux Falls.
He declined, however, to confirm or deny whether the child’s death was by natural
causes.
Id.
53. Id.
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whether Abby’s death was by natural causes and that an autopsy had been
conducted Sunday night.54
By Wednesday, the day of Abby’s funeral, which was attended by 350 to 400
people, word of her violent death was out.55 Wednesday was also the day that
newly elected Attorney General Roger Tellinghuisen arrived in Huron to work
with law enforcement.56 The Huron paper referred to interviews that law
enforcement had conducted on Tuesday and now referred to Abby’s death by
stabbing as a homicide.57 Rumors began to fly that the police had already solved
the case, something which Beerman flatly denied, saying, “I wish it was (solved)”
and “If that was the case, I’d be doing something besides what I’m doing.”58
In the days immediately following Abby’s violent death, Debra had not yet
been identified as a suspect, and Huron’s parents feared for the safety of their own
children.59 The Huron hardware stores all reported spikes in the sales of locks.60
The schools undertook special care with unnerved children.61 Teachers attempted
to quell gossiping; the population was on edge. One rumor suggested a cult-like
killing.62 The community feared an unidentified child killer who lurked in their
midst.
On Friday, Beerman described the status of laboratory forensic analyses
which were being conducted, some of which were expected to take some time, and
he announced that the investigation had revealed a suspect.63 Law enforcement
offered comfort in repeatedly assuring the community that Huron’s children were
not in any danger. Beerman explained: “We feel that there is no immediate danger
to others, even though we will always encourage parents to do their best to
safeguard their children.”64 Beerman’s assurances were repeated in the Sunday
paper.65 Although the state forensics laboratory completed its tasks quite
speedily, the testing by a Chicago laboratory proceeded at a slower pace,
54. Id.
55. Roger Larsen, Sheriff Denies Rumors That Case Solved in Recent Stabbing, HURON DAILY
PLAINSMAN, Apr. 9, 1987, at 1 [hereinafter Larsen I]; Roger Larsen, Schools Respond to Questions on
Child’s Death, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Apr. 9, 1987, at 1 [hereinafter Larsen II]. The public relations
officer for the Attorney General’s office noted that the Jenner homicide was “the first major case in South
Dakota since Tellinghuisen took office and that he wanted to come to Huron to offer any assistance he
could.” Larsen I, supra note 55, at 1.
56. Larsen I, supra note 55, at 1.
57. Jenner Probate Continues, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Apr. 8, 1987, at 1.
58. Larsen I, supra note 55, at 1.
59. Roger Larsen, Suspect Claimed in Stabbing: Tensions Ease in Huron, HURON DAILY
PLAINSMAN, Apr. 12, 1987, at 1.
60. See id. (discussing the increase in lock sales in the area and the domination that the event had on
conversations throughout the town); see also Larsen II, supra note 55, at 1 (discussing schools’ approach
of “play[ing] it low key” around the children).
61. Larsen II, supra note 55, at 1.
62. Angela Kennecke, Convicted 1987 Child Killer, Debra Jenner, Granted Parole in Unpublicized
Hearing, KELO-LAND (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.keloland.com/news/investigates/convicted-1987child-killer-debra-jenner-granted-parole-in-unpublicized-hearing/ (quoting Tellinghuisen as referring to
rumors “about this being some type of cult killing” in 1987).
63. Suspect Claimed in Jenner Killing, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Apr. 10, 1987, at 1.
64. Id.
65. Larsen, supra note 59, at 1.
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eventually prompting criticisms from both Beadle County State’s Attorney Mary
Keller and the Sioux Falls Argus Leader in an editorial.66 A week and a day later,
Tellinghuisen took over the case.67
Once the Chicago forensic assessments were completed, the Attorney
General convened an eight-person grand jury to begin the indictment process,
commencing on June 24.68 Circuit Court Judge Eugene Martin, of Huron, would
preside, while Tellinghuisen would present evidence alongside Assistant Attorney
General (and chief of the litigation division) Dennis Holmes.69 Assistant Attorney
John Bastian (who would later serve as Circuit Court Judge in the Fourth Circuit
for twenty years) would also present evidence to the grand jury.70 Given the secret
nature of grand jury proceedings, very little information appeared in the press
while it deliberated, but Tellinghuisen did reveal that Abby’s death had been the
result of being “stabbed by a sharp instrument, ‘a knife or something of that
nature.’”71 He also confirmed that the grand jury investigating Abby’s death
would not be the same panel that had recently convened to investigate Beadle
County pimping and prostitution activities.72 He reassured the public that the atlarge suspect did not present a threat to the community and confirmed that
members of the Jenner family had not been ruled out as suspects.73 A Huron Daily
Plainsman editorial the next day re-emphasized the Attorney General’s assurances

66. See Roger Larsen, Tests Continue in Jenner Probe, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Apr. 30, 1987,
at 1 (noting Keller’s “concerns about the delays in the investigation” and quoting her as saying, “Although
I have received assurances that reports will be forthcoming, my office file on this matter consists of
newspaper clippings and [the autopsy report.]”); Roger Kasa, Keller Unhappy Over Jenner Case Editorial,
HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, May 6, 1987, at 1 (referring to an editorial in the Saturday (May 5) edition of
the Argus Leader (which Keller deemed “irresponsible”) characterizing law enforcement as “overly
cautious”).
67. Roger Kasa, Tellinghuisen, DCI Given Jenner Case, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, May 11, 1987,
at 1. “Complicated murder investigations traditionally involve the attorney general’s office,”
Tellinghuisen explained, and Keller had requested the Attorney General’s office to take over the
investigation. Id. See also Roger Kasa, Limited Local Resources Sends Jenner Case to State, HURON
DAILY PLAINSMAN, May 12, 1987, at 1 (quoting Tellinghuisen as describing the Jenner case, then in its
sixth week, as “a major investigation that takes major resources.”). Tellinghuisen was in Huron speaking
to a government class at the Huron High School and detailing “the 21-year-old drinking age case that he
recently argued before the Supreme Court.” Id. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)
(upholding the constitutionality of the National Minimum Drinking Age Act which withheld five to ten
percent of highway funds from states which failed to adopt a uniform twenty-one-year-old drinking age).
The case began in District Judge Andrew Bogue’s courtroom who held against the state. His decision was
affirmed by the Eight Circuit. South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628, 634 (8th Cir. 1986). Oral arguments
had been held on April 28. Transcript of Oral Argument, Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (No. 86-260). Ultimately,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed Judge Bogue and the Eighth Circuit panel, reasoning that
Congress’ spending power had been properly exercised. Dole, 483 U.S. at 212.
68. Roger Kasa, Attorney General to Convene Grand Jury on Jenner Death, HURON DAILY
PLAINSMAN, June 16, 1987, at 1. See also SDCL § 23A-5-1 (2016) (providing: “A grand jury shall consist
of not less than six nor more than ten members.”).
69. Kasa, supra note 68, at 1.
70. Roger Kasa, Grand Jury Meets Again in Huron on Jenner Case, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN,
July 14, 1987, at 1.
71. Kasa, supra note 68, at 1.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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that the suspect was being monitored daily and “that the suspect is not a threat to
the Huron community.”74
Although the Beadle County Grand Jury was convened, as planned, on June
24, the Attorney General did not immediately begin presenting evidence.75 Nine
days later, the Plainsman noted impatiently that the Attorney General had not yet
met with the grand jury to present evidence of Abby’s murder.76 A schedule had
been worked out with the grand jurors, Tellinghuisen explained, but the schedule
itself would not be made public.77 The grand jury met for the first time on July
6.78 It met again on July 13.79 It met for a third time in a two-day session the
following week, and a fourth time on July 29.80 The location of the proceedings
was kept secret, and not all of the grand jury meetings were disclosed.81
Tellinghuisen projected that the probe would conclude at or near the end of
August.82
His forecast proved precise. On the morning of Friday, August 28, following
the testimony of approximately fifty witnesses over several non-consecutive days,
the grand jury issued a double indictment which was handed to Circuit Court Judge
Irvin Hoyt.83 The charges were second-degree murder and first-degree
manslaughter.84 The people of Huron then learned what some may have been
suspecting for some time; that Debra herself was the suspect in the case.
Judge Hoyt issued an arrest warrant, Debra turned herself in voluntarily the
same morning, and she was “held in the Regional Correction Center under
$100,000 bond.”85 The front-page story announced: “Mother arrested in Jenner

74. Jenner Murder Probe to Reach Crucial Stage with Grand Jury, Opinion, HURON DAILY
PLAINSMAN, June 18, 1987, at 4.
75. Roger Larsen, Tellinghuisen, Jury Not Yet Meeting on Jenner Case, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN.
July 3, 1987, at 1.
76. Id.
77. Id. The paper recalled that authorities had “said that residents of the community should not fear
for their safety.” Id.
78. Kasa, supra note 70, at 1.
79. Id.
80. Roger Kasa, Tellinhuisen Sees Another Month’s Work in Jenner Case, HURON DAILY
PLAINSMAN, July 29, 1987, at 1.
81. See Grand Jury Meets at Undisclosed Site Wednesday, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Aug. 26,
1987, at 1 (reporting that the grand jury met again on August 26); Grand Jury Hears More Testimony,
HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Aug. 27, 1987, at 1-2 (noting that the grand jury continued to hear evidence
the next day, August 27).
82. Roger Kasa, Jenner Jury Probe Nears ‘Deadline,’ HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Aug. 24, 1987,
at 1.
83. Roger Kasa, Mother Arrested in Jenner Slaying, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN Aug. 28, 1987, at
1; Roger Larsen, Requests Jury Trial: Jenner Pleads Not Guilty, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Sept. 16,
1987, at 1.
84. Jenner Faces Arraignment, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Sept. 15, 1987, at 1. See SDCL § 2216-7 (2017) (describing second-degree murder as that “perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to
others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life, although without any premeditated
design to effect the death of any particular person . . . .”); SDCL § 22-16-15 (2017) (defining first-degree
manslaughter in relevant part as that, “[w]ithout any design to effect death . . . and in a heat of passion,
but in a cruel and unusual manner,” or “[w]ithout any design to effect death . . . but by means of a
dangerous weapon . . . .”).
85. Kasa, supra note 83, at 1.
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slaying.”86 That same afternoon, her bond was adjusted downward to a $50,000
property bond in her first court appearance, alongside Gienapp (who would later
serve as a Circuit Court Judge for the Third Judicial Circuit). Holmes argued that
her bond should not be reduced based on the danger she posed “to others in the
community and to her 5-year-old son.”87 But Judge Hoyt reduced the bond over
his objections. If Gienapp had pointed out that the state had been reassuring the
public for months that their unnamed suspect posed no danger to the community,
the Plainsman did not record it. Debra promptly posted bond and was released.
Debra’s arraignment hearing was held on the afternoon of September 16.88
Judge Hoyt reviewed Debra’s rights and outlined the possible sentences that she
would face—a minimum sentence of life for the conviction of second-degree
murder (without the possibility of parole) and a maximum of life imprisonment
for first-degree manslaughter.89 Debra plead not guilty to both charges.90
A trial date of February 16 was announced in November.91 Judge Martin
reserved three weeks for the trial. The judge noted that he had not received any
defense motion for a change in venue, and so the trial was expected to take place
in the Beadle County Courthouse in Huron.92 Pre-trial motions were argued in
December.93 The prosecution and defense tussled over an exchange of witness
lists and a transcript of the grand jury proceedings.94 They scrimmaged again in
a day-long suppression hearing in January of 1988.95 Gienapp argued that Debra’s
statements during her questioning by the police should be excluded. Judge Martin
considered oral arguments and also required briefing by counsel. Ultimately, he
ruled in favor of the state.96
In preparation for the trial, five-page questionnaires were mailed to ten panels
of twenty-five jurors each—a total of 250 potential jurors.97 The panels would
report in staggered intervals beginning on Tuesday, February 16. Judge Martin
planned to select two alternates in addition to the twelve jurors.98 Reporting
86. Id.
87. Kim Smith, Reduced to $50,000: Jenner Posts Bond, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Aug. 30, 1987,
at 1. Holmes also pointed to the seriousness of the charges against Debra and the possibility she might
flee. Id.
88. Larsen, supra note 83, at 1. See also SDCL § 23A-7-1 (2016) (outlining procedures for
arraignments).
89. Larsen, supra note 83, at 1. See SDCL § 22-16-12 (2017) (classifying second-degree murder as
a Class B felony); SDCL § 22-16-15 (classifying first-degree manslaughter as a Class C felony); SDCL §
22-6-1(2) (2017 & Supp. 2021) (mandating life imprisonment for conviction of a Class B felony); SDCL
§ 22-6-1(3) (providing a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for conviction of a Class C felony).
90. Larsen, supra note 83, at 1. Judge Hoyt noted “that he would be leaving the circuit court bench
Oct. 2 to begin new duties as South Dakota’s second federal bankruptcy judge, and he asked that a schedule
for pre-trial motions be worked out between [the attorneys] and Circuit Judge Eugene Martin.” Id.
91. Debra Jenner Trial to begin on Feb. 16, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Nov. 24, 1987, at 2.
92. Id. See also SDCL § 23A-17-8 (2016) (outlining change of venue motions).
93. Areas of Disagreement in Jenner Case Studied, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Dec. 4, 1987, at 2.
94. Id.
95. Suppression Hearing Held Regarding Jenner Case, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Jan. 7, 1988, at
1.
96. Id.
97. Roger Larsen, Jenner Trial to begin this Week, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Feb. 14, 1988, at 1.
98. Id.
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Tuesday morning were Holmes and Bastian from the Attorney General’s office
and Gienapp, assisted by attorney William D. Matheson, for the defense. By
Tuesday noon, the selection was proceeding at a good clip, and by the lunch recess,
“four of about seven potential jurors had been passed for cause, in which the court
found no reason why they should be dismissed.”99 The Plainsman explained:
When 54 to 60 potential jurors have been passed for cause,
that panel will be used to select the 12 jurors and two alternates
who will hear the case.
Attorneys on both sides will each be able to reject – with
peremptory challenges – 20 of those 54 to 60 in the final panel,
until the final 14 are selected.
The alternates, who won’t know who they are, will listen to
the expected two weeks of testimony, but will be dismissed before
the jury retires to deliberate the case.100
The pace of jury selection slowed somewhat Tuesday afternoon, and Judge
Martin dialed back the start time for Wednesday from the usual 9:00 a.m. to 8:00
a.m.101 Thursday court also commenced at 8:00 a.m.102 By lunchtime on
Thursday, twenty-nine jurors had been passed for cause, making them eligible to
be among those ultimately selected.103 Potential jurors who said they had already
formed an opinion about the guilt or innocence of the accused or who personally
knew the Jenners—and one who claimed to have a hearing problem—were
dismissed.104 Jury selection continued through Friday. Attorneys Holmes and
Bastian indicated in voir dire that the jury should expect to be shown “unpleasant
photographs of the victim.”105 There was a brief moment of levity when
Matheson asked a potential juror whether anything in the questionnaire he had
completed in mid-January needed to be corrected.106 The man paused, considered
the question carefully, and, “in all seriousness,” said he lived twenty-one miles
from the Beadle County Courthouse—not twenty-two miles, as he had answered
on the questionnaire.107 The response prompted Matheson to quip to the judge, “I
believe we just saved Beadle County 20 cents . . . .”108
By Friday’s end, eighty-seven potential jurors had been questioned, and
forty-three passed for cause.109 Finally, by noon the next Tuesday, a panel of

99. Roger Larsen, Selection of Jury Under Way, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Feb. 16, 1988, at 1.
See also SDCL § 23A-20-8 (2016) (describing juror challenges for cause).
100. Larsen, supra note 99, at 1.
101. 30 Queried for Jenner Trial Jury, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Feb. 17, 1988, at 1.
102. Attorneys Question 55 Jurors in Jenner Case, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Feb. 18, 1988, at 1.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Roger Larsen, Trial Testimony Begins this Week in Jenner Case, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN,
Feb. 21, 1988, at 1.
106. Roger Larsen & Kim Smith, First Witness May Testify Wednesday in Jenner Trial, HURON
DAILY PLAINSMAN, Feb. 19, 1988, at 1.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id.
109. Larsen, supra note 105, at 1.
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fifty-nine had been picked.110 From those, a jury of five men and nine women
was selected following the peremptory challenge phase of jury selection on
Wednesday morning.111 Opening statements began at 2:00 p.m. the same day.112
At the center of the trial, both sides recognized, were Debra’s statements to
law enforcement. The prosecution, in its opening statement before a packed
courtroom, characterized her statements as a confession and described Debra’s
actions as a “frenzied attack.”113 The state also projected that the evidence would
show that a Chicago Cutlery knife and a toy airplane had been used in Abby’s
death and that the home showed no signs of forced entry.114 The defense disputed
the validity of her alleged confession and asserted that “to this day, the Jenners do
not know who is responsible for the death of Abby Lynn Jenner last April.”115
The defense would assert that Debra’s statements to law enforcement were “in the
form of a question and not a statement, and that the defendant was emotionally
distraught after a grueling seven-hour interrogation.”116 The state managed to
introduce several exhibits, including photographs and a diagram of the interior of
the Jenner home, along with Abby’s autopsy photographs, and to call four
witnesses—a police officer and three ambulance attendants—before court
recessed after the first partial day.117
The following day, the first witness for the state was Dr. Kortum, the Jenner
family physician. She outlined Abby’s allergies, diagnosed at three months of
age, which, if she ingested milk or soybeans, would cause her ear infections,
sniffles, diarrhea, and potentially, sleeplessness.118 She also described two phone
calls from Debra, the first being a rather calm report on the morning of April 5, in
which Debra stated that Abby’s body had been found in her bedroom and that an
autopsy would be required.119 The second phone call, on April 5, was to relay
that the police did not think that she could have killed her daughter and to query
whether Abby might have had meningitis or a seizure disorder.120 Other witnesses
followed, including Dr. Randall, who testified as to his autopsy findings and
reviewed slides of Abby’s entry wounds—“cuts, scrapes and slashing-type
wounds on her neck and arms . . . .”121 After the conclusion of the first full day

110. 59 Potential Jurors Picked in Jenner Trial, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Feb. 23, 1988, at 1.
111. Roger Larsen, Jury of 14 Selected for Trial of Jenner, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Feb. 24, 1988,
at 1 [hereinafter Jury of 14]. The jury included a heavy equipment operator, a custodian, a farmer, a sales
clerk, a businesswoman, a travel agent, two homemakers, a hostess, and a teacher. Roger Larsen, Members
of Jury Have Varied Background, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Feb. 24, 1988, at 1.
112. Jury of 14, supra note 111, at 1-2.
113. Roger Larsen, 10 Witnesses Give Testimony, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Feb. 25, 1988, at 1A.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Roger Larsen, Jurors to Retire for Deliberation: Jenner Trial Nearing Conclusion, HURON
DAILY PLAINSMAN, Mar. 13, 1988, at 1.
117. Id.
118. Larsen, supra note 113, at 1A.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Roger Larsen, Jenner Trial in Recess; Autopsy Reports Given, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN,
Feb. 26, 1988, at 1 (relaying testimony by Dr. Randall, a forensic pathologist concerning Abby’s seventy
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of evidence on Thursday, February 26, court recessed to allow one of the attorneys
to attend the funeral of his mother-in-law on Friday.
The trial resumed on Monday, February 29, for another full day of witnesses
for the state.122 On Tuesday, Lindberg described Debra’s demeanor—swinging
from near-hysteria to calm and back again—when she conceded to him she may
have “psyched out” and that “a person could click, clean up the mess and not
remember.”123 He also testified that Debra told him that she could not remember
killing Abby. Giegling testified the next day how Debra, at the conclusion of her
interview on the Tuesday after Abby’s murder, said: “I did it, I did it, I did it” three
to six times in an “ear piercing, high-pitched voice” when her husband entered the
interrogation room.124 He also noted that “the most striking thing about her
appearance was that her eyes didn’t blink.”125 One of Debra’s co-workers at
Pioneer Hi-Bred testified that she had had lunch with Debra at Riverside Park in
either late May or early June and that Debra told her that on account of her talks
with law enforcement, “she was beginning to have doubts and maybe could have
killed Abby.”126
She quoted Debra saying “she wished she could
remember . . . .”127 Late Tuesday afternoon, Beadle County Deputy Sheriff Jim
Sheridan described an exterior search of the Jenner family home in which he
examined a bag of garbage and found nothing remarkable in it. Additional
conversations with co-workers filled the testimony on Wednesday.128 The state
rested; court adjourned for the week just after noon on Thursday.129
Court resumed on Monday, March 7.130 The defense began its case with
Debra being called to the stand. Tearfully, she denied killing her daughter. Her
testimony was relatively brief, and the state was already cross-examining her
before lunch.131 During cross, Holmes “keyed in on whether the defendant knew
Abby was dead when she began making telephone calls that morning as the
ambulance was on its way to their house.”132 The next day, Reverend Wagner,
his wife, neighbors, and several family members were called by the defense.133
Testimony from Lynn occupied two and a half hours.134 The defense rested, the
stab wounds and their consistency with a knife and characteristics of a small metal toy airplane introduced
into evidence).
122. Roger Larsen, Evidence Was Moved, Jury Told, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN 1 (Feb. 29, 1988).
123. Roger Larsen, ‘Psyched Out’ Used 10-12 Times: Agent, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Mar. 1,
1988, at 1.
124. Roger Larsen, DCI Agent Testifies: Mrs. Jenner said, ‘I did it, I did it,’ HURON DAILY
PLAINSMAN, Mar. 2, 1988, at 1.
125. Id. at 2B.
126. Id. at 2A.
127. Id.
128. Roger Larsen, Friends of Jenner Cite Conversations, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Mar. 3, 1988,
at 1.
129. Roger Larsen, Jury Trial Resumes Monday, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Mar. 6, 1988, at 1.
130. Roger Larsen, Jenner Denies Killing Daughter, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Mar. 7, 1988, at 1.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2.
133. Roger Larsen, Two Who Cleaned Jenner Room ‘Unaware of Slaying,’ HURON DAILY
PLAINSMAN, Mar. 8, 1988, at 1.
134. Roger Larsen, Testimony Ends in Jenner Trial, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Mar. 9, 1988, at 1.
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prosecution quickly called four rebuttal witnesses on Wednesday morning, and
Judge Martin adjourned the proceedings just before 10:00 a.m., asking the jurors
to return on Thursday at 9:00 a.m. to view Abby’s bedroom.135
On Thursday morning, the jurors took a Beadle County Transit System bus
to the Jenner home on Frank Avenue.136 The bus received a police escort. While
the bus idled in the Jenner driveway, jurors entered the home, two at a time, to
view Abby’s cramped eight-foot by ten-foot bedroom, escorted by the bailiff.137
Judge Martin had instructed them not to ask any questions or make any comments
while they were within the home. Debra, Matheson, and Holmes observed silently
from the home’s interior. The prosecution’s motion for jurors to view the home
related to Debra’s claim “that when she entered Abby’s bedroom the morning the
young girl was found dead, she quietly sneaked into the room to get a dress to iron
for her to wear to church.”138 Debra had testified that “she went around the foot
of the bed, to the closet and then back again, but noticed nothing wrong with Abby,
glancing over at her to only see the top of her head.”139 Given the tiny area of
Abby’s bedroom, the prosecution implied, for Debra to have noticed nothing
wrong was unlikely.140 Over nine days of testimony, a total of thirty-seven
prosecution witnesses and twelve defense witnesses had been called.141
The jurors were then released for the week, and the attorneys returned to court
to settle jury instructions.142 The defense proposed four alternative instructions
on the defense of unconsciousness as codified at South Dakota Codified Law
section 22-3-1, which provides that a person is not capable of committing a crime
if the alleged perpetrator “committed the act charged without being conscious
thereof.”143 Unconsciousness—or automatism—has been described by the
Wyoming Supreme Court as “the state of a person who, though capable of action,
is not conscious of what he is doing” so that “[w]hile in an automatistic state, an
135. Id. The rebuttal witnesses were “Beadle County Sheriff Tom Beerman, Division of Criminal
Investigation Agent Jerry Lindberg, Huron Detective Capt. Dave Rand and Wolsey carpenter Victor
Dracy.” Id. Dracy revealed that two or three weeks prior to Abby’s murder, Lynn had remarked that he
was tired on account of Abby having kept him up the night before; that this was common because Abby
had irregular sleep patterns and that “he and Debra took turns getting up with Abby.” Id. at 2. The defense
had no rebuttal witnesses of its own. Id.
136. Roger Larsen, Jurors Look at Bedroom Where Abby Jenner Slain, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN,
Mar. 10, 1988, at 1.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2.
139. Id.
140. The visit to the Jenner home generated the effect on the jurors that the state desired. Years later,
juror Shirley Johnson was quoted as saying: “We were in that bedroom . . . . It was so narrow between
the bed and the wall, you hit the bed walking by. How could you do that and not see your child?” Steve
Young, Confession More Critical than Hairs, Jurors Say, ARGUS LEADER, Aug. 6, 2000, at 5A. Another
juror, Deloris Ziltener, agreed. Id.
141. Roger Larsen, Jurors to Retire for Deliberation: Jenner Trial Nearing Conclusion, HURON
DAILY PLAINSMAN, Mar. 13, 1988, at 1. The Plainsman also notes “four rebuttal witnesses called by the
state.” Id. However, only one of the rebuttal witnesses had not been called previously.
142. Roger Larsen, Jurors Look at Bedroom Where Abby Jenner Slain, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN,
Mar. 10, 1988, at 1.
143. SDCL § 22-3-1(4) (2017). See Appellant’s Replacement Brief, supra note 25, at 28-39 (outlining
the defense’s arguments).
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individual performs complex actions without an exercise of will.”144 The court
rejected the instructions and instead adopted an instruction on amnesia, which
simply confirmed that amnesia is not a defense.145
On Monday morning, attorneys made their closing arguments, Judge Martin
delivered the jury instructions, the two alternate jurors were dismissed, and, just
before noon, the jury began deliberating.146 The jury was given the choice
between finding Debra (i) guilty of second-degree murder but not first-degree
manslaughter; (ii) not guilty of second-degree murder but guilty of first-degree
manslaughter; or (iii) not guilty of both counts.147 The final jury, less the two
alternates, was comprised of eight women and four men.148
The jury deliberated for seven hours before concluding its deliberations on
Monday.149 Returning Tuesday morning, deliberations continued for another
hour and a half. They notified the bailiff at 10:40 a.m. on Tuesday that a verdict
had been reached. Shortly after 11:00 a.m., Judge Martin assembled counsel and
Debra in the courtroom, and the verdict of guilty of second-degree murder (and
not guilty of first-degree manslaughter) was read.150 Key to the jury’s decision,
jurors said later, was Debra’s confession.151

144. Fulcher v. Wyoming, 633 P.2d 142, 145 (Wyo. 1981). “Automatistic behavior may be followed
by complete or partial inability to recall the actions performed while unconscious.” Id. See also California
v. Lisnow, 151 Cal. Rptr. 621, 624 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1978) (emphasizing that unconsciousness
“negates capacity to commit any crime at all.”); State v. Weatherford, 416 N.W.2d 47, 55 (S.D. 1987)
(holding that a jury instruction which included “language indicating that the burden of proof rests on the
State to prove the defendant was conscious at the time he committed the act, or acts, constituting the
offense charged, is consistent with the proper burden.”).
145. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 41, at 51 (citing State v. Johnson, 139 N.W.2d 232 (S.D. 1965)).
146. Roger Larsen, Jury Begins Deliberating Jenner Case, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Mar. 14,
1988, at 1. Gienapp pointed out the lack of a motive connecting the accused with the crime: “A mother is
going to murder her daughter because she has an allergy?” Id. “There is no evidence to show that she had
anything but love for her daughter.” Id. In order to convict, he continued, “jurors must be convinced that
the defendant mocked her emotional call to the 911 emergency number, that she cleaned up and went back
to bed that night, that she went downstairs and washed bloody clothes she was wearing.” Id. at 1-2.
Gienapp also returned to Debra’s alleged confession and the tactics used by the police saying that they
were “just as brutal as beating a confession out of someone.” Id. at 2. Holmes countered that it was even
more outlandish to claim that an unknown intruder had been the culprit when there was no sign of forced
entry and the only physical evidence suggesting an intruder was a wreath which had been on the front door
but was found placed on a living room chair. Id. Holmes remarked that it was “inconceivable” that Debra
could have entered Abby’s room and not seen or smelled blood in navigating past the bed and to the closet:
“‘You were in that house,’ he told the jury, ‘You almost have to turn sideways to get around the bed.’”
Id. Judge Martin cautioned the jurors that their tour of Abby’s bedroom was not evidence but to allow
them “to get a better understanding of” witnesses’ testimony. Id. Holmes also focused the jury’s attention
on Debra’s saying “I did it” repeatedly. Id.
147. The State appealed this jury instruction, arguing that Debra “was charged with two distinct
statutory violations and could be convicted of both.” State v. Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710, 724 (S.D. 1990).
The South Dakota Supreme Court did not consider the issue because it did not grant Debra a retrial. Id.
See also Wilcox v. Leapley, 488 N.W.2d 654, 657 (S.D. 1992) (holding “double homicide convictions for
a single death are improper.”).
148. Roger Larsen, Jenner Found Guilty of Murder, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Mar. 15, 1988, at 1.
149. Id.
150. Id. See also SDCL § 23A-26-1 (2016) (governing verdict returns).
151. Steve Young, Confession More Critical than Hairs, Jurors Say, ARGUS LEADER, Aug. 6, 2000,
at 5A.
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The Plainsman described Debra as showing no visible emotion.152 “Her
Bible rested on the table in front of her, and she leaned on one of her attorneys,
Matheson, Sioux Falls, after jurors were dismissed from the courtroom.” 153 Judge
Martin thanked the jurors for their service.154 On Holmes’ motion, bond was
revoked, and Debra, accompanied by Matheson, was escorted from the courthouse
by Beadle County Sheriff officers to jail.155
Sentencing was set for 4:00 p.m. on Friday, March 25, and occupied just
thirty minutes.156 Given the mandatory nature of the sentence, neither Holmes
nor Gienapp advanced any arguments, and Debra declined to make any statements
either.157 Judge Martin pronounced the statutory mandatory sentence of life
without parole, and on March 30, Debra began serving her sentence at the
Springfield Correctional Facility, which had opened in December of 1984, after
the campus of the University of South Dakota, Springfield, had been converted
into a co-ed prison.158 The dormitories once used by students were used to house
prisoners; the male prisoners in two dorms while the female inmates occupied
Harmon Hall.159
2. Direct Appeal
Debra appealed, still represented by Gienapp. The state was again
represented by Bastian. Debra raised eight issues, which the court consolidated
into four:
1. Whether the circuit court had erred in denying her motion
to suppress her statements during the April 7 questioning;

152. Larsen, supra note 148, at 1.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Jenner Sentencing Set, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Mar. 18, 1988, at 1. See also SDCL § 23A27-1 (2016) (governing sentencing hearings).
157. Roger Larsen, Jenner to Begin Serving Life Term, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Mar. 27, 1988, at
1.
158. Roger Larsen, Debra Jenner to Begin Serving Life Term at Springfield Facility, HURON DAILY
PLAINSMAN, Mar. 25, 1988, at 1; Roger Larsen, Jenner Appeal Several Months Away, HURON DAILY
PLAINSMAN, Mar. 30, 1988, at 1. Judge Martin denied a defense motion to release Debra on bail pending
an appeal. Larsen, supra note 148, at 1.
159. Larsen, supra note 148, at 1. For some time after Debra’s conviction, there were suggestions
that the grand jury might also indict Lynn and/or others for tampering with evidence (e.g., cleaning up)
following Abby’s murder but nothing ever came of it. See Jury to Examine Actions of Others in Jenner
Case, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Mar. 20, 1988, at 1 (relaying Tellinghuisen’s statement that “he will
ask the eight-member grand jury to look at the actions of Lynn, Merlin Jenner and others.”); Grand Jury
Reconvenes, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Apr. 5, 1988, at 1 (reporting on Tellinghuisen’s statement “that
it would be up to the grand jury to decide who it would look at in terms of possible additional charges in
the case.”); Roger Larsen, Grand Jury Views Possible Cover-up, HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN, Apr. 6, 1988,
at 1 (referring to “Merlin Jenner, Debra’s father-in-law, and Ruby Wagner, the wife of the Jenner’s pastor”
who had “testified that they had removed blood-stained bedding from Abby’s room, but before they
learned” she had been murdered); see also Grand Jury May Meet with A.G., HURON DAILY PLAINSMAN,
May 25, 1988, at 1 (noting that the grand jury panel had been reconvened on April 5 but had not met
since). The grand jury’s eighteen month term expired at the end of 1988. Id.; SDCL § 23A-5-20 (2016).
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2. Whether incorrect jury instructions regarding
unconsciousness, amnesia, and insanity were submitted;
3. Whether the circuit court had erred in granting the state’s
motion in limine to exclude evidence of an unknown perpetrator;
and
4. Whether the conviction was supported by insufficient
evidence.160
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by Justice
John Konenkamp, rejected all of Debra’s arguments and upheld the jury
verdict.161 The issue which most occupied the court—and generated forceful
dissents by two of its members—was the first, concerning Debra’s statements to
law enforcement during the lengthy questioning on April 7.162 Debra’s attorneys
described the interrogation as “eight hours of emotional terrorism,” which
produced only “confused, inconsistent, and emotional outbursts.”163 The state
emphasized the fact that “the subject of killing one’s child is certainly in and of
itself an emotional subject.”164
The claimed error in failing to suppress Debra’s statements contained two
components: whether the statements were involuntary and whether they were
elicited in a custodial environment (requiring Miranda warnings).165 In rejecting
Debra’s arguments, the majority paid special attention to the fact that “she was
actually begging the officers to assist her in recalling what happened or who had
killed her daughter.”166
Justice Robert Morgan, in his dissent, first decried the DCI agents’ failure to
tape record the April 7 interrogation proceedings. “It is inconceivable to me,” he
wrote, “that they would gather a team of agents from across the state, with two
sets of polygraph equipment, and not have any form of tape recorder available.”167
Justice Morgan was also troubled by an interrogation technique utilized by “both
Devaney and Giegling [that] had planted the seed in Debra’s mind that ‘there is a
rational Debbie and an irrational Debbie,’ and ‘a good Debbie and a bad
Debbie.’”168 Justice Morgan went on to emphasize in his dissenting opinion that
so long as deference was granted to the trial court’s findings (such as the size of
the interrogation room, the defendant’s age and experience, etc.), “the trial court
is in no better position than we are to judge the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the confession was obtained in violation of the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment.”169
160. State v. Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710, 711 (S.D. 1990).
161. Id. at 724.
162. See generally id. at 716-20, 724-32 (focusing on the admissibility of Debra’s statements).
163. Appellant’s Replacement Brief, supra note 25, at 24.
164. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 41, at 39.
165. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating Miranda rights); State v. Janis,
356 N.W.2d 916 (S.D. 1984) (discussing Miranda rights in South Dakota).
166. Jenner, 451 N.W.2d at 720.
167. Id. at 724 (Morgan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 725.
169. Id. at 726 (citation omitted).
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Justice Richard Sabers largely skirted the standard of review issue.170 But
viewing the totality of the circumstances, he opined that “it is not even a close
question that the statements were in voluntary.”171 Among the facts highlighted
by Justice Sabers were Debra’s lack of sleep, lack of food, and the various
interrogation techniques utilized, including hostility, yelling, trickery, and false
hypotheticals.172 The agents “played upon her strong religious convictions and
her sex life with her husband.”173 Justice Sabers also read Debra’s request that
Giegling “jar her memory” and that DeVaney “hypnotize her to help her
remember” as indicative of “Jenner’s emotional breakdown, rather than any desire
to make voluntary statements.”174
Justice Morgan’s emphasis upon the standard of review issue was prescient.
Six years after the Jenner direct appeal decision, the United States Supreme Court
issued its decision in Ornelas v. United States.175 Ornelas held:
[R]easonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de
novo on appeal. Having said this, we hasten to point out that a
reviewing court should take care both to review findings of
historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to
inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law
enforcement officers.176
In State v. Hirning,177 the South Dakota Supreme Court, following Ornelas,
adopted the de novo standard of review for reasonable suspicion and probable
cause determinations for warrantless searches.178 It subsequently applied the de
novo standard to appellate review of the voluntariness of an admission.179 As a
result, it is possible that the South Dakota Supreme Court today would reverse a
finding of voluntariness and/or a custodial context under a less deferential

170. See id. at 732 (Sabers, J., dissenting) (opining that Debra’s statements were involuntary “without
regard to the standard of review” but Justice Sabers also “join[ed] Justice Morgan’s dissent in all
respects.”).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 728-29.
173. Id. at 729. According to Debra’s testimony, DeVaney asked Debra: “Why do we find long blonde
hair in Abby’s hand? Are you filthy to your husband, now that he knows you did it?” Appellee’s Brief
App., supra note 19, at 56. DeVaney denied that he questioned Debra in this manner. Id. Judge Martin
found that Giegling “would preface some questions with the fact that the Defendant was a good mother
and Christian and then go on to ask the question.” Appellee’s Brief App. B at 207, Jenner, 451 N.W.2d
710 (No. 16240).
174. Jenner, 451 N.W.2d at 729 (Sabers, J., dissenting).
175. 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
176. Id. at 699.
177. 1999 SD 53, 592 N.W.2d 600.
178. Id. ¶ 9, 592 N.W.2d at 603.
179. State v. Stanga, 2000 SD 129, ¶ 8, 617 N.W.2d 486, 488. See also, e.g., State v. Ralios, 2010
SD 43, ¶ 24, 783 N.W.2d 647, 654 (reiterating: “This Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress
alleging a violation of a constitutionally protected right as a question of law by applying the de novo
standard.”) (citations omitted). The South Dakota Supreme Court still considers “the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation as factual determinations, giving deference to the trial court’s
findings of fact.” Ralios, 2010 SD 43, ¶ 25, 783 N.W.2d at 655 (citations and internal citations omitted).
“However, the issue of whether the interrogation was ultimately voluntary is a legal question.” Id. (citation
omitted).
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standard of review. However, the weight granted to Judge Martin’s detailed
findings suggests that a reversal and retrial would still be unlikely, even under a
less deferential standard of appellate review.180
E. POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
1. Federal Habeas
Next, Debra sought habeas corpus relief in federal court. She filed a petition
in the Southern District of the U.S. District Court in South Dakota.181 Judge John
Jones confirmed that Debra, being “young, in good health, and well educated,”
had not made involuntary statements and that her questioning had taken place in
a non-custodial environment.182 Judge Jones, therefore, denied her habeas relief.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.183 It noted “[t]he testimony of the
psychologist who evaluated Jenner immediately after the interviews [who]
confirmed that she was still alert and in control of her faculties” in upholding the
finding of voluntariness.184 It emphasized that “Jenner had cooperated with the
police investigators for two days, voluntarily came to the police station to answer
further questions . . . and was not arrested even after making incriminating
statements” in affirming the finding of a non-custodial interrogation.185 Later,
Debra’s petition for certiorari was also denied.186
2. State Habeas
In January of 1996, Debra made an application for a writ of habeas corpus
in Beadle County Circuit Court.187 She alleged that she had received ineffective
assistance of counsel and moved for discovery of the crime scene hair samples in
order to conduct a DNA analysis on them.188 Among her assertions were that her
trial counsel had failed to counter the testimony of Dr. Randall regarding the knife
marks in Abby and that the hair and blood samples taken were never subjected to
DNA analysis.189 Circuit Judge Ronald Roehr dismissed her claims without an

180. See, e.g., Appellee’s Brief Appx. B, supra note 173, at 201-13 (containing Judge Martin’s
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order re: Suppression Motion); Jenner v. Smith (Smith), 982
F.2d 329, 331, 335 (8th Cir. 1993) (discussed below) (upholding the finding of voluntariness concerning
Debra’s statements under the de novo standard).
181. See Smith, 982 F.2d at 330, 333 (describing the district court proceedings). The district court
opinion is not reported.
182. Id. at 333.
183. Id. at 335.
184. Id. at 334.
185. Id. at 335.
186. Jenner v. Smith, 510 U.S. 822 (1993) (denying cert.).
187. Jenner v. Dooley (Dooley), 1999 SD 20, ¶ 6, 590 N.W.2d 463, 466.
188. Id.; Appellant’s Brief at 54, Dooley, 1999 SD 20, 590 N.W.2d 463.
189. Dooley, 1999 SD 20, ¶ 7, 590 N.W.2d at 467.
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evidentiary hearing.190 He reasoned that her writ was untimely and further that
Debra could not show prejudice as a matter of law.191
The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed unanimously in another opinion
authored by Justice Konenkamp, but on different grounds than the circuit court.192
The South Dakota Supreme Court noted that South Dakota law permits the
dismissal of belated habeas applications.193 At the time, South Dakota Codified
Law section 21-27-3.2 provided that an application may be dismissed when the
state has been prejudiced by the delay and that prejudice is presumed when the
application is filed more than five years after the judgment.194 Because Judge
Roehr had not held an evidentiary hearing to allow Debra an opportunity to rebut
the presumption, the court held that dismissal for untimeliness was
inappropriate.195 However, the court reasoned that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(5)
(habeas applications are civil in nature—not criminal) had been correct.196 It
ruled that trial counsel’s failure to counter Dr. Randall’s testimony did not, as a
matter of law, prejudice the outcome:
Dr. Randall admitted that [the airplane-shaped] wound on Abby’s
body was only “similar” in shape [to the toy airplane]. Dr. Randall
did not testify that any of the wounds were in fact caused by the
airplane found in the Jenner home. What could a counter expert
have said on this point that would be so impeaching as to have
changed the outcome of this case? Debra’s counsel gives us no
suggestion.197
The court also adopted a framework for Debra’s discovery motion for postconviction DNA analysis. A three-part test was articulated: whether (1) the
evidence would meet the Daubert standard; (2) a favorable result would likely
produce an acquittal upon retrial; (3) the costs would not impose unreasonable
burdens on the state.198 Applying these guidelines, the court concluded that DNA
testing should not be ordered since no likelihood could be discerned “that a
favorable DNA test result of the hair and blood evidence would produce an
acquittal were Debra granted a new trial.”199
Obviously, hair and blood evidence that matched an assailant other than
Debra would present compelling evidence for her defense and ought to qualify her
190. Id. ¶ 9, 590 N.W.2d at 467.
191. Id.
192. Id. ¶¶ 11-22, 590 N.W.2d at 468-72.
193. Id. ¶ 12, 590 N.W.2d at 468.
194. SDCL § 21-27-3.2 (repealed 2012).
195. Dooley, 1999 SD 20, ¶ 12, 590 N.W.2d at 468. “How the court could know whether the
memories of witnesses had faded is unknown, and neither appellate counsel suggest an answer.” Id.
196. The federal counterpart to South Dakota’s Rule 12(b)(5) is Rule 12(b)(6). SDCL § 15-6-12(b)(5)
(2014); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Thompson v. Summers, 1997 SD 103, ¶ 4, 567 N.W.2d 387, 389 n.1
(“SDCL 15–6–12(b)(5) is identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).
197. Dooley, 1999 SD 20, ¶ 17, 590 N.W.2d at 471.
198. Id. ¶ 20, 590 N.W.2d at 472.
199. Id. ¶ 21, 590 N.W.2d at 472. “Because the intruder theory was so implausible, . . . DNA
testing . . . appears to revive a legally and factually insupportable defense.” Id. (citing State v. Jenner, 451
N.W.2d 710, 722-23 (S.D. 1990)).
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for a new trial. The court, however, reasoned that the hair and/or blood might be
shown to have originated from either (1) Debra; (2) Abby; (3) Lynn; or (4) some
other unknown assailant.200 If the samples originated from Debra, then this would
only support her conviction. If the samples originated from Abby, it “would only
create another circumstance on which to argue reasonable doubt.”201 A showing
that Abby had strands of her own hair in her tiny hands “would not be conclusive
on the question of innocence, especially in light of all the other evidence against
[Debra], including her oblique but damaging admissions.”202
The court
concluded it was too unlikely that the samples would match Lynn given that the
state “criminalist, Rex Riis, eliminated the father as the originator of the hair found
on Abby’s body and the credibility of his examination [was] not challenged in this
respect.”203 The court found it even less probable that the samples would match
an unknown assailant.204 Law enforcement had “found no trace of any trespasser
in the home.”205 The intruder theory was “so implausible”—and the evidence in
support of it “so remote”—that at trial, Debra had not been allowed to introduce
any of it.206 (This “truly persuasive” demonstration of “actual innocence”
requirement for reopening a conviction can be modified by a statutory framework
for testing of DNA evidence, an observation which underlies the proposed
legislation drafted by State Senator Kermit Staggers, as touched upon below.)207
200. See id. ¶ 19, 590 N.W.2d at 472 (discussing the reasoning for a decision on whether to reopen a
case when newer technology becomes available).
201. Id. ¶ 21, 590 N.W.2d at 472.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. Debra’s third-party perpetrator evidence amounted to:
1. Debra’s neighbor secured restraining orders against her ex-husband to avoid
physical abuse;
2. A woman telephoned the neighbor’s house at 1:50 a.m. on the night Abby
died, asking for Russell (the ex-husband’s name was Russell);
3. A guest at the neighbor’s party on the night Abby died saw a man she did
not know walking near the Jenner home at 11:30 p.m.; and,
4. A man was seen in the graveyard where Abby was buried eight days after
she died, who dressed similarly to the man seen walking near the Jenner home.
State v. Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710, 722 (S.D. 1990). In Debra’s trial, Judge Martin had excluded it. Id.
This ruling was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 722-23 (citing State v. Luna, 378 N.W.2d 229 (S.D. 1985))
(adopting a balancing test for third-party perpetrator evidence and affirming exclusion of evidence that
shortly after a killing, a violent drunk was seen near the crime scene covered in blood). Debra asserted
prosecutorial misconduct in her state habeas proceedings on account of the prosecutor’s claim that there
was no evidence of a third-party perpetrator when the trial court had precluded her from offering evidence
on that theory. Dooley, 1999 SD 20, ¶ 7, 590 N.W.2d at 467. The South Dakota Supreme Court declined
to consider this argument because it had not been raised in Debra’s direct appeal. Id. ¶ 10, 590 N.W.2d at
468 n.1. In Debra’s direct appeal, she had asserted that the trial court had improperly excluded her thirdparty perpetrator evidence. Jenner, 451 N.W.2d at 721-23. She did not argue alternatively that if the court
held that the evidence was properly excluded that the prosecutor’s claim that no such evidence even existed
constituted reversible error. As a result, it was dismissed without consideration in her habeas proceedings.
207. Nebraska v. El-Tabech, 610 N.W.2d 737, 747 (Neb. 2000) (citations omitted). See also Engesser
v. Young, 2014 SD 81, ¶ 38, 856 N.W.2d 471, 484 (concluding in the context of that case that the court
“need not consider whether a freestanding claim of actual innocence exists under the South Dakota
Constitution.”). Engesser v. Young also discusses the South Dakota Legislature’s enactment of South
Dakota Codified Law section 21-27-5.1 in 2012 governing newly discovered evidence and the state
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Accordingly, the dismissal of Debra’s habeas application and the denial of her
motion for discovery were affirmed.208
3. A § 1983 Claim
A third post-conviction legal proceeding was commenced by Debra in
connection with a manila envelope containing color photographs of Abby, which
had made its way into Debra’s parole file. Her efforts to exclude the photos led
to an unsuccessful petition for a writ of mandamus with the South Dakota Supreme
Court and a federal claim. Before summarizing these legal efforts, however, it is
necessary to tell how she became eligible for parole in the first place. We will
then return to the manila folder litigation.209
F. THE JANKLOW FACTOR AND DEBRA’S COMMUTATION
Initially, Debra was housed at the co-ed state prison at Springfield. Governor
William J. Janklow had successfully campaigned—at no small political cost—to
close a branch of the University of South Dakota at Springfield and convert it to a
medium-security prison.210 The college closed, and the new prison opened in
1984.211 The Springfield prison was later renamed the Mike Durfee State
Prison—also under Janklow’s watch—in 1999.212
When a new and dedicated women’s prison opened in Pierre in 1997, Debra
moved there and remained incarcerated there until 2021.213 Not long after her
conviction, Debra’s husband Lynn filed for divorce.214 In 1998, Debra
remarried.215 She had met her new husband, Michael Tyler, at the then co-ed state
prison in Springfield and took his name by hyphenating her Jenner surname.216
Tyler was serving a sentence for kidnapping; he was released in 1997.217 Debra

statutory writ of habeas corpus. Engesser, 2014 SD 81, ¶¶ 23-28, 856 N.W.2d at 479-82. See also infra
Part II(F) (discussing Stagger’s proposed legislation).
208. Dooley, 1999 SD 20, ¶¶ 21-22, 590 N.W.2d at 472.
209. Infra Part II(G)(5).
210. Marshall Damgaard, Closing Time: A Twenty-five-Year Retrospective on the Life and Death of
the University of South Dakota at Springfield, 39 S.D. HIST. 189, 189 (2009).
211. Dakota Town Upset by Plan to Close School, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 1984),
https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/06/us/dakota-town-upset-by-plan-to-close-school.html.
DEP’T
OF
CORR.,
212. Mike
Durfee
State
Prison,
S.D.
https://doc.sd.gov/adult/facilities/mdsp/dedication/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
213. Adult Corrections: South Dakota Women’s Prison, S.D. DEP’T OF CORR.,
https://doc.sd.gov/adult/facilities/wp/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
214. Joe Kafka, Parole Board Denies Request of Mother Who Murdered Her Child, RAPID CITY J.
(Sept. 19, 2007), https://rapidcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/parole-board-denies-request-ofmother-who-murdered-her-child/article_4ed4d36c-8fcf-571a-bb9e-567780a14323.html.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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went by the name Debra Jenner-Tyler until, following Michael’s release, they
were divorced.218
Around this same time, Staggers of Sioux Falls became interested in Debra’s
case.219 He introduced bills in the State Legislature regarding DNA testing.220
He claimed that he wanted to see a DNA testing of Debra in order to determine
whether she was really guilty of her daughter’s death.221 The initial bill proposed
a “loser-pays” cost allocation of approximately $5,000 in lab fees.222 Staggers
served in the State Senate from 1995 until 2002.223 He died in 2019.224 When
Debra finally admitted her guilt to Janklow, Staggers was surprised, and even a
bit skeptical, saying: “I suppose she was just being realistic if this was an
opportunity to get out of jail.”225
Initially, Debra was ineligible for parole on account of her life sentence
without the possibility of parole. Janklow, a four-term South Dakota governor,
however, wielded his clemency power rather generously.226 In 2002, Debra met
with a member of Janklow’s staff and, for the first time, conceded her guilt. In
the final days of his fourth term as Governor, Janklow met with Debra at the state
airplane hangar in the capitol city of Pierre, inside Janklow’s car.
Fifteen years had elapsed since her daughter’s murder in April of 1987 when
Debra finally confessed to the crime in late 2002. As recently as 2000, Debra had

218. Id.
219. Young, supra note 16, at A1.
220. See S.B. 108, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2000); S.B. 228, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2001);
S.B. 91, 77th Sess. (S.D. 2002). The first bill passed the Senate but was defeated on the House floor. S.B.
108, 2000 Leg., 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2000). The second bill passed the Senate, squeaked by (3930) in the House, but was vetoed by Janklow and a veto-override failed. S.B. 228, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(S.D. 2001). The third bill again passed the Senate but failed in the House State Affairs Committee (112). S.B. 91, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2002).
221. Woman Convicted of Killing Daughter Gets Sentence Reduced, YANKTON DAILY PRESS &
DAKOTAN (Jan. 27, 2003), https://www.yankton.net/news/article_1652bc05-d682-5f58-a562cf72d8754b24.html [hereinafter, Woman Convicted].
222. Steve Young, S.D. Bill Would Ensure Access to Tests for Some Convicts, ARGUS LEADER, Aug.
6, 2000, at 5A.
223. Kermit
L.
Staggers,
LEGACY,
https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/argusleader/obituary.aspx?n=kermit-lstaggers&pid=194585765&fhid=18053 (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
224. Id.
225. Woman Convicted, supra note 221.
226. Stu Whitney, Janklow Used Commutation Power Often, RAPID CITY J. (Jun. 29, 2003),
https://rapidcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/janklow-used-commutation-poweroften/article_3ab6dc69-9049-5601-ab6d-d37f3154288e.html. Between 1995 and 2003, Janklow granted
1,999 commutations. Id. “South Dakota’s commutations led the nation during that time . . . .” S.D.
Governor Reviews Inmate Commutations for Work, CRIME REP. (Jul. 2, 2003),
https://thecrimereport.org/2003/07/02/sd-governor-reviews-inmate-commutations-for-work/. One 1982
commutation, during Janklow’s first two term (1979-87) turned out to be a mistake. The Governor
commuted the sentence of Rocky Blair. “Months later Blair killed a nurse in McKennan hospital’s parking
ramp.” Our boy Janklow ….again……, VTXOA (Feb. 17, 2004), https://www.vtxoa.com/threads/ourboy-janklow-again.4821/. Blair re-offended just eleven days after his release. Arielle Zionts, UPDATE:
Senate Narrowly Passes Bill that Ends Life Without Parole Sentence for Young People, RAPID CITY J.
(Feb. 10, 2021; updated, Mar. 25, 2021), https://rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/crime-andcourts/update-senate-narrowly-passes-bill-that-ends-life-without-parole-sentence-for-youngpeople/article_af9a56b6-c2fc-5228-8628-3853738d0772.html.
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publicly insisted upon her innocence. The Argus Leader quoted her as identifying
a credible suspect, without naming the suspect.227 Debra claimed:
“There were days that I wish I could” admit to killing Abby,
“just to make it stop.”
....
“I can’t . . . because that wouldn’t be the truth.”
“We have a solid case . . . . We have a name. We have
witnesses to this name. This man has a motive, a history, and
suspicion is high of him.”
“And I believe we have the physical evidence that, if tested,
would identify it as him. That’s why I want DNA testing.”
....
“There is hair on the evidence list that is the same as mine
and [Abby’s], a light brown . . . . But there is also hair on that list
that is a whole different color. That’s what we want tested.”
....
“All I know is, that’s not my hair.”228
Two years later, inside his car at the airplane hangar, Janklow would describe
how Debra expressed deep remorse, cried through their entire meeting, and
confessed to killing Abby. Convinced that “what happened was in an emotional
heat of passion when she killed that child,” Janklow commuted her sentence from
life to one hundred years, a decision which proved unpopular with the public.229
The commutation made Debra immediately eligible for parole—a discretionary
decision vested in the South Dakota Board of Pardons and Paroles.230
On account of the severity and violent nature of her conviction, parole for
Debra would require two steps. First, a two-member panel (or “sub-panel”) of the
board would have to agree to send her request to the full board.231 The sub-panel
could deny her parole, but it lacked the power to approve it. Second, a majority
of the full board (typically a month following the two-member panel’s decision)
would have to vote in favor of her parole, with or without specific conditions that
the board might impose. If never paroled by an action of the Parole Board, she
227. Young, supra note 16, at 1, 4A.
228. Id.
229. Woman Convicted, supra note 221. “Janklow drew criticism in January when it was learned he
dropped the sentence of Debra Sue Jenner-Tyler—convicted of stabbing her child to death in 1987—from
life to 100 years, making her eligible for parole.” Whitney, supra note 226.
230. See SDCL § 24-15-5(1) (2013) (stating “[a]n inmate is eligible for parole, subject to § 24-15-4,
after deducting from the inmate’s sentence the statutory time granted for good conduct pursuant to § 245-1: (1) If convicted of a felony for the first time, when the inmate has served one-fourth of the time
remaining”); SDCL § 24-5-1 (2013) (stating “[e]very inmate sentenced for any term less than life . . . and
subject to the provisions of §§ 24-2-17 and 24-2-18, is entitled to a deduction of four months from his or
her sentence for each year and pro rata for any part of a year for the first year to the tenth, and six months
for the tenth year and for each year thereafter until the expiration of the period of the sentence as
pronounced by the court, for good conduct.”).
231. See SDCL § 24-15A-10 (2021) (providing that “[t]he chair of the board may designate panels of
two or more board members to conduct hearings pursuant to this chapter and chapters 24-13, 24-14, and
24-15, take testimony, and take final action”).
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would have “flatted” her sentence and been released on September 25, 2039,
assuming the full allowance for good behavior and further assuming that she did
not predecease that date.232 She would then have been eighty-three years old.233
Debra qualified for a new parole hearing every eight months, with the ability
to waive one or more hearings if she chose.234 (This law was amended in 1996 to
extend the maximum term between parole hearings, but her crime predates that
change.) Even after being finally paroled in 2021, she retains a kind of technical
and genuine confinement. As a statute confirms, “[e]ach parolee shall at all times
be considered confined, in the legal custody of the Department of Corrections, and
shall remain under conviction for the crime for which the parolee was convicted
and sentenced.”235
G. PAROLE HEARINGS (2003-PRESENT)
1. 2003
Debra’s first parole hearing was held in February of 2003, just months after
Janklow’s reduction of her sentence.236 Debra was represented by Terry L.
Pechota (former U.S. Attorney for South Dakota).237 The state was represented
by Chief Deputy Attorney General Mark Barnett, who insisted that Debra ought
not to be released, but that she ought not to serve another fifteen to thirty years in
prison, either.238 (Mark Barnett served as Attorney General until 2003 and was
appointed to the Circuit Court bench in 2007, retiring in 2019.) Some three dozen
supporters of Debra also attended. The two-member sub-panel, comprised of
Chery Laurenze-Bogue of Dupree and Dennis Kaemingk of Mitchell, listened to
Debra on a Tuesday and forwarded her on to the full board to consider her
application for parole on Thursday of the same week.
Members of the board listened to the tape recording of Debra’s conversation
with Janklow and Laurenze-Bogue noted: “In there, he had to press her also to say
that she committed murder[.]”239 The board reviewed gruesome photographs of
232. Amended Verified Complaint Ex. 1, supra note 47, at 3.
233. Kafka, supra note 214.
234. See SDCL § 24-15A-3 (2013) (suspending the application of numerous sections of title 24 to
individuals “sentenced to prison for a crime committed after July 1, 1996”). Prisoners subject to previous
parole calculations and time frames are referred to as “old system.” Hoeft v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons and
Paroles, 2000 SD 88, ¶¶ 8-9, 613 N.W.2d 61, 63.
235. SDCL § 24-15-13 (2013). See also SDCL § 24-15-19 (2013) (providing that “[i]f the purposes
or objects of parole are not being served, the Department of Corrections and its parole agents may use any
necessary means to establish discipline, arrest, or take custody and control of the parolee pending the
issuance of a warrant of arrest by the executive director”).
236. Carson Walker, Board Denies Huron Woman’s Parole, RAPID CITY J. (Feb. 21, 2003),
https://rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/board-denies-huron-womans-parole/article_ea9a4384-30a4541b-bd84-7bcea2724b6f.html.
237. Amended Verified Complaint Ex. 1, supra note 47, at 2.
238. Id. at 3. Barnett also noted the support for Debra—even from those she deceived concerning her
guilt—and said: “If these people deceived by her for so many years stand by her side, I think her day of
parole will come while we’re all still on this planet.” Id.
239. Id.
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the victim, Abby, and one board member described them as nauseating. LaurenzeBogue noted her understanding that Janklow had reviewed Debra’s file, but not
those photos and that the photos demonstrated that Debra had suffered more than
a fleeting lack of control, explaining: “Once you view the pictures, there’s
absolutely no way it was a momentary loss of control, because she herself says
she went to the kitchen to get the knife . . . . That child was brutally murdered,
and it took a long time to do it.”240
The board denied Debra’s first request for parole, as it did in her second and
third hearings.241
2. 2005
Debra’s fourth parole hearing was held in March of 2005.242 The twomember sub-panel again forwarded her on to the full board, which convened the
following month. Debra explained that she qualified for a program which would
permit her to remain at the prison but accept employment outside the prison for
the first half-year or so of her parole. Barnett once again urged the board that it
was too early for parole given how long she had denied her own culpability and
took advantage of others to raise funds for her defense by falsely claiming
innocence.243
In a letter provided to the parole board, Barnett wrote:
We have several reports from her fellow inmates that Ms. JennerTyler tells the board, in only the most vague and evasive way, that
she did do the crime, but then goes back in the cell hall and tells
them she really didn’t do it and is just telling you that so you will
let her out[.]244
Barnett went on: “Anyone that can butcher her own defenseless daughter in
a crib and then for over a decade scam many good Christian people out of hardearned money to promote her release from prison has a black heart to the
core[.]”245 Barnett’s points were compelling and well-taken. Debra was once
again denied parole.

240. Id. See also infra p. 89 (considering the space in the narrative in which presumably Debra
retrieved the knife). If one takes at face value Debra’s claim to have no recollection of having committed
the murder while accepting that she now accepts the overwhelming evidence of her guilt as proof of her
culpability, her narrative of how the murder occurred—like the juror’s and ours—is based a reasoned
analysis of the available evidence.
241. Doris Haugen, Parole Board Denies Request from Child Murderer, BLACK HILLS PIONEER
(Aug.
26,
2004),
https://www.bhpioneer.com/parole-board-denies-request-from-childmurderer/article_209612ee-8032-5ada-8c2c-c3c917678ed7.html.
Debra’s third parole application
hearing was also referred to the full board, but the board decided against parole. Id.
242. S.D. Woman Who Killed Daughter Seeks Parole, SIOUX CITY J. (April 20, 2005),
https://siouxcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/s-d-woman-who-killed-daughter-seeksparole/article_b7de1975-00ef-54dd-9759-6fa907d0bd63.html.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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3. 2007
Two years later, at Debra’s eighth parole hearing in 2007, Debra testified: “I
feel so guilty . . . for the mess that I made . . . . The thought that it was me makes
me just want to throw up.”246 This time, Attorney General Larry Long (who
became a Second Circuit Court Judge in 2009) appeared before the board to argue
against Debra being granted parole. He said that when Debra’s sentence was
reduced to 100 years, she “received all of the lenience she was entitled to
get . . . .”247 He continued, “I don’t know how long is long enough is for Mrs.
Jenner, but I will say this. Twenty years, which is about what it is now, is not long
enough . . . .”248 The two-member panel agreed, rejected Debra’s request, and did
not forward her on to the full parole board.
4. 2013
At this particular point in this essay, I need to insert a personal narrative. In
2013, I was a newly appointed member of the South Dakota Board of Pardons and
Paroles. About halfway through a morning’s worth of hearings at the second
component of a two-person sub-panel, Debra, her attorney, and a representative
of the attorney general’s office presented themselves for her hearing. Although I
am a lifetime South Dakotan, more or less, and was living in Rapid City both at
the time of Abby’s murder and during Debra’s trial, I could not recall ever hearing
of Debra or anything about her prior to flipping to her file as she entered the room
at the women’s prison.249
The appearance of attorneys in a parole hearing is not uncommon, but I would
estimate that fewer than one in thirty or so hearings include counsel. Witnesses
and guests are also not uncommon—a spouse, parents, pastors, and so on—and
their appearance is less infrequent than lawyers.
I cannot recall all the details of the 2013 hearing now, but I do remember that
Debra and her attorney presented a compelling case for parole. Debra “clicked all
the boxes.” Let us assume, for the purposes of this article, that her disciplinary
history could not have been improved. And she had been eligible for parole for a
long time already without ever having been released, so she also lacked a history
of failed attempts at parole that so many parolees exhibit. Her parole plan was
prudent; her parents were willing to support her. Moreover, I recall, Debra
emphasized her parents’ ages and articulated her objective of being paroled while
they were still living. Her demeanor was quiet and forthright. When her attorney

246. Kafka, supra note 214.
247. Id. The quoted text (“all the lenience she was entitled to get . . . .”) is a direct quote of the text
of the newspaper article, but the article does not frame it as a direct quote of Attorney General Long.
248. Id.
249. My ignorance of Debra’s indictment and trial can only be explained by the rare attention, as a
twenty-year-old, that I devoted to newspapers or current events. Today, at age fifty-five, I am more
attentive to such matters, and less attentive to the ones I was when I was twenty.
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concluded, I felt myself feeling open, if not yet favorable, toward the idea of voting
to forward her on to the full board.
By the time the assistant attorney general had concluded, I felt otherwise.
The gravity of her crime—the absolute horror of it—was simply unparalleled in
anything I had seen in a parole hearing.250 It was unimaginable. I recall asking
Debra, respectfully but directly, what had made her do it. What had triggered it?
What had been the catalyst? Her eyes became downcast. She shook her head. It
seemed as if the horror was simply beyond either of our abilities to penetrate.
Coupled with the additional tale of an orchestrated campaign to raise funds for her
innocence by which numerous individuals were convinced, perhaps tricked, to
make donations toward her cause, my interior pendulum swung back. I was firmly
convinced now that a full board hearing would be fruitless.
Debra, I know now, has no recollection of having murdered Abby. The
horror that took place sometime during the early morning of April 5 (or perhaps
late on April 4), 1987, is blocked from her conscious recollection. She cannot
recall it. Amnesia is not uncommonly associated with traumatic events.251 The
fact that Debra is both morally and legally responsible for the event taking place
does not mean that it was not traumatic for her—so traumatic that even today there
is only a blank space in her recollection between going to bed on April 4, 1987,
and awakening the next morning. Indeed, I would venture that the fact that she
has come to take responsibility and ownership of that horror only deepens the
divide that her subconscious mind has constructed to prevent her from reliving it.
The human mind seems to have self-protective wiring preprogrammed into it.252
Before my fellow board member and I discussed our mutual decision to
“continue Jenner 8 months” until her next automatic parole hearing date, I also
250. Homicides, generally, are relatively rare offenses. “In the state system, less than 3 percent of
new court commitments to state prison typically involve people convicted of homicides.” MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 101 (rev. ed. 2012). Moreover, a good slice of those prisoners will
never qualify for a parole hearing at all.
251. See generally Jane E. McNeil & Richard Greenwood, Can PTSD Occur with Amnesia for the
Precipitating Event?, 1 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY 239 (1996) (discussing the link between PTSD
and amnesia); Eduardo D. Espiridion, Jayesh Gupta, Andre Bshara & Zachary Danssaert, Transient Global
Amnesia in a 60-year-old Female with Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, CUREUS (Sept. 28, 2019),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6827854/?report=classic (noting the link between PTSD
and amnesia). When Stephen King was “barely four,” he “had gone off to play at a neighbor’s house – a
house that was near a railroad line.” STEPHEN KING, DANSE MACABRE 90 (1981). King relays that “the
kid I had been playing with had been run over by a freight train while playing on or crossing the tracks
(years later, my mother told me they had picked up the pieces in a wicker basket).” Id. But King retained
no memory of the event. Id.
252. I once had a good friend whom I have since lost track of, a South Dakotan who was scraping by
in New York. One day, he was the victim of a hit and run. He left his apartment, crossed the street, and
a gypsy cab hit him. He was thrown through the air and very seriously injured. He was not expected to
live, and then once it was clear that he would survive, not expected to walk again. He did. He even
regained enough athleticism to be my yoga instructor, years later. He could recall brushing his teeth on
the morning of the accident and nothing thereafter until regaining consciousness in the hospital. The
accident itself—even his beginning to cross the street—were all blocked, perhaps permanently, by his
brain. I have no reason to doubt, therefore, that Debra cannot recall stabbing Abby, what led to it, nor
what followed it (cleaning up, etc.). Indeed, this is perfectly consistent with her behavior with law
enforcement in the days following Abby’s murder when she requests assistance in determining what
happened.
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recall asking the assistant attorney general something to this effect: “If it’s still too
soon for Ms. Jenner to be released on parole today, when will it be time?” He did
not have an answer.
5. Two Mandamus Writs and the § 1983 Claim
As foreshadowed above, Debra’s third post-conviction legal proceeding
arose out of her parole hearings.253 These proceedings focused on the contents of
a manila envelope. Debra pursued an objection to a manila envelope of
photographs being included as part of her parole file.254 Inside the envelope were
family snapshots of Abby, along with photographs of the crime scene, and horrific
images taken during Abby’s autopsy on the evening of Sunday, April 5, in Sioux
Falls. The autopsy photographs were especially graphic and gruesome. Debra
claimed that the manner in which they had been included in the file was suspect
and that the photos themselves were unduly prejudicial.
Procedurally speaking, Debra’s first step in attempting to suppress the grisly
photos stretched back to 2009 when her attorney requested access to his client’s
file maintained by the Board of Pardons and Paroles. By an e-mail dated January
19, 2009, the request was denied, and it was explained that because the file is
considered confidential, a court order for release would be required.255 This
determination was perfectly consistent with the law governing parole files.256
Debra filed suit in the Hughes County Circuit Court requesting a writ of
mandamus to compel the board to allow her to review her file.257 (Debra also
sought an order allowing her to undergo a licensed psychologist to examine
her.)258 Circuit Judge John L. Brown denied her petition for the writ.259 She
appealed.260 The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in January of 2010.261
Following Abby’s murder in 1987, Sheridan had helped with the
investigation. He obtained consent from Lynn to retrieve the toy airplane from
the Jenner home and accompanied the Jenners to Reverend Wagner’s home at the
conclusion of Debra’s most intense day of police questioning.262 Later, as a parole
253. See supra Part II(G)(5) (explaining how Debra’s third post-conviction legal proceeding arose).
254. Jenner v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles (S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles), 789 N.W.2d 320 (S.D.
2010) (table).
255. Mandamus Brief for Appellant at 4, S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 789 N.W.2d 320 (Nos.
25347 and 253478).
256. SDCL § 24-15A-14 (2013). This code provisions states:
No person other than members of the board, its executive director, the secretary, and
any person specifically delegated for such access by the secretary, may inspect the
file unless otherwise ordered by a circuit court or subpoena after notice to the
secretary and an opportunity for a hearing on any objections to inspection.
Id.
257. Appellant’s Mandamus Brief, supra note 255, at 1.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. S.D. Bd. Of Pardons & Paroles, 789 N.W.2d at 320.
261. Id.
262. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 19, at 20-21.
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board member, he consistently recused himself from hearings involving Debra.263
Going back to her first parole hearing in February of 2003, a large manila envelope
with twenty-six photos of Abby was included in her file, circulated among board
members, and discussed in her hearings.264 In 2005, for example, Barnett told the
board, “The old adage, a picture is worth a thousand words, could not apply in any
other case like it does in this one.”265 And in 2003, a board member confessed
that the photographs “absolutely turned my stomach” and “I can’t begin to
comprehend something like that.”266
The outside of the manila envelope was addressed from Sheridan to a second
board member and postmarked January 27, just under one month prior to Debra’s
first parole hearing.267 The file revealed no written request for the photographs
and no release from the coroner, DCI, the Attorney General, or the Beadle County
Sheriff’s Office.268 After Debra filed a lawsuit, Sheridan admitted to an Argus
Journal reporter that he had been the source of the illicit pictures.269 According
to Debra, Sheridan had “done by indirection that which he could not do directly—
argued against Jenner’s release on parole.”270 Her counsel continued:
If former Attorney General is right about that old adage [that a
picture is worth a thousand words], then a board member who had
recused himself before and after he salted Jenner’s file with illicit
photographs has spoken volumes about a subject on which he had
surrendered his right to speak.271
Consequently, in the latter part of 2014, Debra submitted a motion and
accompanying brief with the Board of Pardons and Paroles, demanding that the
unsettling photographs be removed from her file.272 I recall having participated
in the December 12, 2013 hearing on Debra’s motion. I understood—either from
markings on the envelope or from what a fellow board member or a representative
of the Department of Corrections said—what the envelope contained. I elected
not to peruse its contents. I felt that they were unnecessary for making a
determination of Debra’s motion. I also anticipated that the photographs were
ones that a viewer could not un-see. I had no wish to examine them. After
considering the motion, the Board unanimously denied her request.273
263. Brief for Appellant at 6, Jenner v. Nikolas, 828 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Appellant’s
1983 Brief].
264. Id. at 3.
265. Id. at 6.
266. Id. at 5.
267. Id. at 3-4.
268. Id. at 4.
269. Id. at 7.
270. Id. at 6.
271. Id. at 7.
272. Complaint, at Ex. A-B, Jenner v. Nikolas, No. 4:14-CV-04147-KES, 2015 WL 4600352 (D.S.D.
2015).
273. Id. at Ex. C. Special Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Correction Patrick Pardy
wrote in a letter to Debra’s attorney, Mark Marshall: “‘[T]he motion was denied because the board believes
the statute allows the executive director to include any information that is relevant to the board’s
consideration in the file and does not want to tie the director’s hands regarding future decisions about what
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Next, in February of 2014, Debra applied for a writ of mandamus with the
South Dakota Supreme Court, seeking review of the Board’s decision.274 The
South Dakota Supreme Court denied her application in another 3-2 split
decision.275 One week later, however, the Executive Director of the Board
removed some of the photographs on his own initiative.276 Citing South Dakota
Codified Law sections 24-15-1 and -2, he confirmed “that he removed all
photographs received before January 14, 2014, from Jenner’s file . . . with the
exception of photographs received from the South Dakota Attorney General . . .”
and that those remained “available to aid Board members who wish to consider
the nature and circumstances of Jenner’s offense when determining whether to
grant or deny parole.”277
The next month, Debra applied for an ex parte writ of mandamus with the
South Dakota Supreme Court.278 This time, she sought a review of the Board’s
decision to retain the manila envelope and its remaining contents. Later, in
September of 2014, Debra brought a § 1983 claim against the members of the
parole board.279 She claimed that Abby’s photographs had had the effect of
denying her right to have her parole applications heard by a fair and impartial
board. District Court Judge Schreier dismissed her claim after concluding that
Debra had not raised a protected liberty interest, as required in a § 1983 claim.280
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and thereafter also refused to grant
an en banc rehearing.281
6. 2017
By 2017, newspaper accounts of Debra’s parole hearings had almost lost
count of the number of unsuccessful parole hearings she had had. Pierre’s Capitol
Journal simply noted that she had “been denied parole more than a dozen times,
and other times has waived her right to a parole hearing . . . .”282 As far as the
photos may or may not be included.’” Id. Pardy was appointed to the bench in 2015. Governor Appoints
New Judge in South Dakota’s Third Circuit, VOLANTE (Vermillion) (May 7, 2015),
http://volanteonline.com/2015/05/governor-appoints-new-judge-in-south-dakotas-third-circuit/. Marshall
himself has served as a federal magistrate judge and later as a magistrate judge for the Seventh Judicial
Circuit Court.
274. Complaint, supra note 272, at Ex. G. By early 2014, I was no longer a member of the Board,
having had to resign after one year’s service on account of the newly imposed demands of an academic
(as a newly hired associate professor at the University of South Dakota School of Law in the fall of 2013)
which precluded the level of participation on a monthly basis demanded of members of the Board. I would,
however, later serve as an auxiliary board member for a period of four years. See SDCL § 24-13-13 (2021)
(describing former board member service in an auxiliary capacity).
275. Complaint, supra note 272, at Ex. I.
276. Appellant’s 1983 Brief, supra note 263, at 8.
277. Nikolas, 2015 WL 4600352, at * 1.
278. Appellant’s 1983 Brief, supra note 263, at Ex. VIII.
279. See generally Nikolas, 2015 WL 4600352, at *1-2 (detailing Debra’s § 1983 claim).
280. Id. at *6.
281. Jenner v. Nikolas, 828 F.3d 713, 718 (8th Cir. 2016).
282. Stephen Lee, Debra Jenner, Serving 100 Years in Prison in Pierre for Slaying 3-year-old
Daughter, Has Parole Hearing in July, CAP. J. (June 30, 2017), https://www.capjournal.com/news/debra-
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media was concerned, her parole application denials had become almost routine
and, it seems, her failure to secure parole, all but assured.283
By this point, Debra had appeared before a sub-panel a total of twenty-one
times.284 On three occasions, her application was forwarded to the full board.285
But each time, her application for parole was ultimately denied. On November
16, 2020, parole for Debra was denied again by a two-person sub-panel staffed by
board members Chuck Schroyer (former Assistant Attorney General and State’s
Attorney for Hughes County) and Reverend Patricia White-Horse Carda (a retired
Episcopal priest).286
7. 2021
On August 9, 2021, Debra appeared for her next parole hearing at the Pierre
Women’s Prison before board members Schroyer and Gordon Swanson (a retired
Circuit Court Judge and vice-chair of the Board of Pardons and Paroles).287
Attorney Raleigh Hansman of the Sioux Falls law firm of Meierhenry Sargent,
LLP appeared on Debra’s behalf, while Attorney General Jason Ravnsborg
appeared for the State.288 Those in attendance included Debra’s parents (ages
eighty-four and eighty-seven) and her daughter-in-law.289
Ravnsborg emphasized the heinousness of the crime, Debra’s fundraising
campaign, and shared his view that she had not yet shown sufficient remorse.290
Hansman focused on an important alteration to Debra’s parole plan since her last
hearing: an offer of employment from the same local thrift shop where Debra had
worked through a work-release program the last several years.291 Traditionally, a

jenner-serving-100-years-in-prison-in-pierre-for-slaying-3-year-old-daughter/article_a0f396fa-5d5211e7-9e32-1fbdb7d355f9.html.
283. See Zionts, supra note 226 (narrating the Senate’s passage, in 2021, of Senate Bill 146, amending
South Dakota Codified Law section 24-15-4 so as to make persons convicted for an offense committed
before age twenty-six and sentenced to life imprisonment eligible for discretionary parole at age fifty and
emphasizing—to allay the fears that this could mean the release of Debra, or inmates like her—that parole
is never granted automatically). “The fact that Janklow commuted the life sentence of Debra Jenner but
the parole board has repeatedly refused to grant her parole is evidence that this new law will work, Sen.
[David] Wheeler said in reference to the Huron woman convicted of killing her daughter.” Id. Senator
Arthur Rusch, who had introduced the bill, was also quoted as saying: “It’s not a get out of jail free
card . . .” and inmates will “only be released if the parole board decides that they’ve been rehabilitated and
they’re no longer dangerous.” Id. Senate Bill 146 failed in the House Judiciary Committee. S.B. 126,
96TH S.D. LEG., REG. SESS. (S.D. 2021), https://sdlegislature.gov/Session/Bill/22242.
284. E-Mail from Traci Fredrickson, Operations Supervisor of the South Dakota Board of Pardons
and Paroles, to author (Dec. 9, 2020, 14:43 CDT) (on file with author).
285. Id.
286. BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS {STATE OF S.D.}, NOVEMBER 2020 BOARD ACTIONS 14 (Nov. 19,
2020), https://boardsandcommissions.sd.gov/bcuploads/ParoleBoardActionsNov2020.pdf.
287. BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS {STATE OF S.D.}, MONTHLY SCHEDULE AUGUST 2021, at 1 (Sept.
7, 2021), https://boardsandcommissions.sd.gov/bcuploads/ParoleBoardScheduleAugust2021.pdf.
288. Telephone Interview with Raleigh Hansman, Meierhenry Sargent LLP (Sept. 23, 2021) (notes
on file with author).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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two-person panel concludes a parole hearing so as to deliberate privately and
notifies the applicant of their decision in writing before the end of the week. That
same process was followed this time, and Debra soon received notice that her
application would be forwarded to the full board the next month.292
Thus, it was on the morning of Thursday, September 16, at the State
Penitentiary in Sioux Falls, that Debra appeared for her full-board hearing, again
with Hansman at her side.293 Attorney General Ravnsborg once again appeared
for the State, this time via Zoom.294 In addition to the supporters for her who had
appeared at her hearing the previous month were Debra’s son, her thrift store
supervisor, and her counselor, Janette LaPlante (all via Zoom).295
Attorney General Ravnsborg reiterated the State’s concerns with and
objections to Debra being paroled. Board member Gregg Gass, State’s Attorney
for Kingsbury County, questioned the quotation from Debra that she may have
“psyched out”296 and emphasized the concern that the catalyst for the crime had
never been identified.297 Hansman responded by pointing to an evidence-based
risk assessment evaluation ranking Debra’s risks as low to none.298 Board
Member Kenneth Albers (former Lincoln County Sheriff and state legislator)
noted that Debra’s risk assessment was the lowest he had ever seen.299 Albers had
served on the board for more than ten years.300 Ultimately, Schroyer moved to
grant parole subject to two conditions: (1) Debra’s submission to a psychiatric
evaluation within ninety days of her release in order to conduct a further risk
assessment at Debra’s expense, mandating that any evaluation recommendations
be followed through with as a condition of parole; and (2) “No contact with
children without specific approval of parole agent.”301 Swanson seconded the
motion.302 The board proceeded to vote—six yeas against three nays—to parole
Debra.303
Remarkably, the media seems to have wholly overlooked Debra’s last two
hearings. The first coverage of the events was not published until two weeks
following the September 16 full board hearing.304 The Argus Leader devoted such
scant attention to the event that it mistakenly quoted a section of the parole board
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. State v. Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710, 711-15 (S.D. 1990) (quoted supra Part II(B)).
297. Telephone Interview with Raleigh Hansman, supra note 288.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Bret Hayworth, Former Canton Legislator Tapped for S.D. Parole Board, SIOUX CITY J. (Jan.
14,
2010),
https://siouxcityjournal.com/news/local/former-canton-legislator-tapped-for-s-d-paroleboard/article_b5fe1498-0153-11df-ba6c-001cc4c002e0.html.
301. BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS {STATE OF S.D.}, SEPTEMBER 16, 2021 MINUTES 2 (Sept. 23,
2021), https://boardsandcommissions.sd.gov/bcuploads/ParoleBoardMinutesSeptember2021B.pdf.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Alfonzo Galvan, Woman Convicted of 1987 Stabbing Death of Daughter Granted Parole,
ARGUS LEADER, September 30, 2021, at 3A.
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minutes relating to another inmate.305 The Huron Plainsman online edition
devoted a mere 121 words to the topic.306
KELO-Land crafted a denser report. It claimed to have misread the online
parole reports.307 Debra’s two-person parole hearing and its positive outcome
were visible for anyone who looked, but she had been inadvertently left off the
published full-board agenda, although a SAVIN (Statewide Automated Victim
Information and Notification) notification had been transmitted both in advance
of and following her full-board hearing.308 Thus, even the KELO-Land report was
more concerned with an implied allegation of misleading the press than it was with
the actual outcome of the hearing. It is probably to Debra’s advantage that her
infamy has faded to such an extent that she is, today, nearly forgotten and ignored.
It may further enhance the likelihood that she will succeed and perhaps even
flourish on parole if she is left to live the remainder of her life in peace.309
Following the quiet reports of Debra’s successful parole hearing, Sheridan was
quoted as saying “that he doesn’t think Jenner is going to harm anyone and that
she paid her dues and he expects her to follow the rules of her parole.”310 Debra
walked away from the Pierre Women’s Prison on October 4, 2021.311

305. Id.; BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS {STATE OF S.D.}, supra note 301, at 2. The Argus quoted from
that section of the minutes relating to parole applicant Arden Long Soldier, who appeared after Debra and
was also granted parole that day.
306. Huron Woman Sentenced in 1987 Stabbing of Daughter Paroled, HURON PLAINSMAN (Sept. 29,
2021),
https://www.plainsman.com/article/huron-woman-sentenced-in-1987-stabbing-of-daughterparoled. The full text is printed here:
A Huron woman serving a 100-year prison sentence for killing her 3-year-old
daughter by stabbing was granted parole earlier this month, according to a report by
Dakota News.
65-year-old Debra Jenner appeared before the parole board in Sioux Falls on
September 15. Her parole was granted subject to submission to psych evaluation
within 90 days. She had spent three decades behind bars and was denied parole more
than a dozen times.
Authorities say Jenner in April 1987 stabbed Abby Jenner more than 70 times
with a toy metal airplane and a kitchen knife. She was sentenced the following year
to life in prison.
Gov. Bill Janklow reduced the sentence to 100 years in return for Jenner
admitting the crime in January 2003.
Id. The pithy text is so condensed, it almost exactly matches the word-count of the initial account of
Abby’s death in 1987, before it was even known that she had not perished of natural causes. See supra
note 52. These tiny accounts bookend the lengthy and sensational coverage over three decades. They
suggest that Debra can now recover a degree of anonymity and perhaps some peace.
307. Angela Kennecke, Convicted 1987 Child Killer, Debra Jenner, Granted Parole in Unpublicized
Hearing, KELO-LAND (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.keloland.com/news/investigates/convicted-1987child-killer-debra-jenner-granted-parole-in-unpublicized-hearing/. The SAVIN website confirms Debra’s
release. Debra S. Jenner Offender Details, S.D. OFF. ATT’Y GEN.: S.D. SAVIN & ALERT NOTIFICATION
SERV., https://savin.sd.gov/portal/Offender/OffenderDetail.aspx?OffenderGuid=510e0c57-0d47-e611b355-005056890ba0 (last accessed Oct. 16, 2021) [hereinafter Debra S. Jenner Offender Details].
308. Kennecke, supra note 307 (quoting Hansman).
309. See Arielle Zoints, South Dakota Woman who Murdered Daughter is Granted Parole, S.D. PUB.
BROAD. (Sept. 30, 2021) https://listen.sdpb.org/news/2021-09-30/south-dakota-woman-who-murdereddaughter-granted-parole (providing a brief 222-word report of Debra’s release).
310. Kennecke, supra note 307.
311. Debra S. Jenner Offender Details, supra note 307.
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H. PAROLE BOARD CONSIDERATIONS
In South Dakota, the Board of Pardons and Paroles is made up of nine
members, with the Governor, the Attorney General, and the South Dakota
Supreme Court each appointing three members to four-year terms.312 The
functions of the Board include granting “the privilege of parole to deserving
inmates,” making pardon and commutation recommendations to the Governor,
and adopting policy.313 It is administered under the supervision of the Department
of Corrections but retains a certain “quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative”
independence.314 Moreover, the Department of Corrections is required to
“cooperate with the Board of Pardons and Paroles and the executive director of
the board, give access to all inmates, and furnish such information as the board or
the director may request pertaining to the performance of their duties.”315 When
assessing the suitability of parole for an inmate, the Board considers numerous
factors, including:
(1) The inmate’s personal and family history;
(2) The inmate’s attitude, character, capabilities, and habits;
(3) The nature and circumstances of the inmate’s offense;
(4) The number, nature, and circumstances of the inmate’s
prior offenses;
(5) The successful completion or revocation of previous
probation or parole granted to the inmate;
(6) The inmate’s conduct in the institution, including efforts
directed towards self-improvement;
(7) The inmate’s understanding of his or her own problems
and the willingness to work towards overcoming them;
(8) The inmate’s total personality as it reflects on the
possibility that the inmate will lead a law-abiding life without
harm to society;
(9) The inmate’s family and marital circumstances and the
willingness of the family and others to help the inmate upon
release on parole from the institution;
(10) The soundness of the parole program and whether it will
promote the rehabilitation of the inmate;
(11) The inmate’s specific employment and plans for further
formal education or training;
(12) The inmate’s plan for additional treatment and
rehabilitation while on parole;
(13) The effect of the inmate’s release on the community;

312.
313.
314.
315.

SDCL §§ 24-13-1 to -2 (2013).
SDCL § 24-13-6 (2013).
SDCL § 24-13-3 (2013).
SDCL § 24-13-6.
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(14) The effect of the inmate’s release on the administration
of justice; and
(15) The effect of the inmate’s release on the victims of
crimes committed by the inmate.316
In parole cases, the question of release is bound up in concerns for the safety
of the community into which the prisoner would resettle.317 These sorts of
questions are most frequent with individuals convicted of sexual abuse, habitual
violence, or repeatedly driving while intoxicated. Even if the individual is eligible
for parole, has completed all the recommended programming, and is free of any
significant disciplinary infractions, it may be inadvisable to parole them.
Community safety concerns are paramount. Evidence of rehabilitation is the
second major concern.
Debra presented few community safety concerns. I say “few” and not
“none.” By this, I mean it seems unlikely that she would commit another violent
act. Certainly, it is possible. It is also possible that I will commit a violent act
tomorrow, next week, or next year. Or that you will. It is possible that any of us
will. Debra is more likely to harm another human being if she is released from
prison given that she physically harmed and ended the life of her daughter. But
compared with other applicants for discretionary parole, she presented few safety
worries.
The Board of Pardons and Paroles may grant a prisoner parole once the
prisoner has become eligible for parole if it determines that:
(1) The inmate has been confined in the penitentiary for a
sufficient length of time to accomplish the inmate’s rehabilitation;
(2) The inmate will be paroled under the supervision and
restrictions provided by law for parolees, without danger to
society; and
(3) The inmate has secured suitable employment or
beneficial occupation of the inmate’s time likely to continue until
the end of the period of the inmate’s parole in some suitable place
within or without the state where the inmate will be free from
criminal influences.318
In some cases, the question of release is tied to unrealized rehabilitation
goals.319 The inmate may have programming still awaiting completion. Serious,
recent, or recurring disciplinary infractions can be viewed as an indication that
rehabilitation has not occurred. Disciplinary infractions can also indicate a greater

316. SDCL § 24-13-7.
317. See, e.g., Barge v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 39 A.3d 530, 546 (Pa. 2012) (emphasizing that the
parole board is required “to protect public safety as its foremost consideration.”); In re Dyer, 283 P.3d
1103, 1108 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (“Public safety is the ‘paramount’ concern in making parolability
decisions.”).
318. SDCL § 24-15-8 (2013).
319. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (emphasizing
that “state-created parole system serve[] the public-interest purposes of rehabilitation”).
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likelihood of recidivism. A behavioral analysis suggests that prisoners ought not
to be rewarded with parole when they have violated the rules of the institution.
Another important factor in a parole decision is a prediction of success
outside the prison walls.320 Is the prisoner’s parole plan sound? Is the prisoner
likely to succeed when the proposed parole plan involves moving in with an
unmarried cohabitant with a history of abuse and addiction? The parole board
might approve a parole application in principal but continue the hearing for a
month to allow some fine-tuning of the individual’s parole plan.
Still another factor is the prisoner’s past success—or lack of success—on
parole.321 Not uncommonly, a prisoner released on parole will re-offend, abscond,
relapse, or otherwise violate the terms of their supervision and be returned to
prison. Not uncommonly, they will be given a second chance at parole, a third
time, even a fourth time on the same underlying sentence. The greater the failed
attempts at parole, of course, the greater the chance that another try will also fail,
although not all parole violations are equal in this regard.
Then, layered on top of this multi-factored rubric, a prudent insistence on
evidence-based practices has been legislatively required.322 The Board of Pardons
and Paroles is also required to employ evidence-based analysis to applications for
parole.323 Evidence-based practices have the goal of ensuring “‘smarter
sentencing’ strategies.”324 As a recent article explains:
Today, recidivism prediction algorithms identify correlations
between preexisting offender background factors (e.g., age,
family background, criminal history) and recidivism not only for
offenders generally but also for subgroups (e.g., sex offenders).
These statistical correlations are transformed into risk assessment
instruments that identify an offender’s predicted probability of
recidivism. Parole board members can then separate higher-risk

320. See Partee v. Evans, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733, 737 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (explaining parole risk assessment
determinations for parole applicants which are designed predict “the likelihood of success of such persons
upon release.”).
321. E.g., Prowell v. Hemmingway, 234 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 2000) (table), 2000 WL 1679451, at * 1
(detailing an inmate’s succession of three paroles and three parole revocations); Montana v. Watson, 686
P.2d 879, 890 (Mont. 1984) (justifying maximum prison sentence based on, inter alia, “past failures on
parole supervision”).
322. SDCL §§ 24-15A-45 to -46 (2013).
323. See SDCL § 16-22-1(7) (2014) (defining “evidence-based practices” as “supervision policies,
procedures, and practices and treatment and intervention programs and practices that scientific research
demonstrates reduce recidivism among individuals under correctional supervision”); see also South
Dakota Public Safety Improvement Act Criminal Justice Initiative, S.D. DEP’T OF CORR.,
https://doc.sd.gov/about/CriminalJusticeInitiative.aspx (last visited July 27, 2021) (explaining that “Parole
Board members will undergo annual training on the use of risk and needs assessments and the use of
evidence-based practices in making parole decisions.”). This mandate was part of Senate Bill 70, the
South Dakota Public Safety Improvement Act (SDPSIA) (a/k/a The Criminal Justice Initiative) that was
signed into law by Governor Dennis Daugaard in 2013. South Dakota Public Safety Improvement Act
Criminal Justice Initiative, supra note 323.
324. Edward E. Rhine, Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz, The Future of Parole Release, 46 CRIME &
JUST. 279, 301 (2017).

SimmonsFINAL(second sub. edits_SM) (Do Not Delete)

258

SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

8/21/2022 4:58 PM

[Vol. 67

from lower-risk offenders, enabling a more efficient use of prison
resources.325
Statistical reports and algorithms promise greater freedom from bias and
subjectivity. As another scholar explains: “These practices include assessing risk
and needs, targeting interventions based on risk and need (focusing resources on
moderate and high-need individuals), relying on graduated sanctions (including
the use of positive reinforcements), utilizing cognitive behavioral therapy, and
measuring outcomes beyond recidivism, including drug use and employment.”326
These various risk assessments primarily aim to predict risks of recidivism with
raw numbers.327 In doing so, they help correct subjective human deficiencies by
predicting objectively whether an individual will re-offend or not. They also
generate a series of shortcomings of their own, however—including algorithmic
biases against racial minorities.328 Still, evidence-based practices can distill and
quantify recidivism risks in a way that is undoubtedly helpful to parole board
decision-making. As a practical tool, they are probably here to stay, at least in
some form.329
I. LOCATING AND MAPPING THE “MERCY SEAT”
1. The Lid of the Mercy Seat
With that historical-legal background unpacked, it is time to return to the
question of mercy. I should roadmap in advance for the reader that I have not
succeeded in finding any firm answers to the questions posed in the introduction,
to wit: What is mercy, where should it be located—if at all—in the context of an
application for parole, and how it can be applied to Debra? Alternatively,
assuming that mercy may play some role in parole decisions, we can ask ourselves,
was it applied so as to permit Debra Jensen to qualify for discretionary parole? Or
do the statutory factors governing parole preclude its application?
Not long ago, I undertook an informal study of an uncle of mine. I never had
the opportunity to meet him, though our lives overlapped. Brother James Ebner
was born to my paternal grandfather’s sister Violet Ebner and her husband, a
railroad station agent, in Itasca County, Minnesota, in 1915. After completing
high school in Duluth, Minnesota, and Glencoe, Missouri, Brother Ebner obtained
six degrees, including a doctorate from the Catholic University of America, and
took his perpetual vows in 1940. I came to know him through a book he penned
325. Edward E. Rhine, Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz, Improving Parole Release in America, 28
FED. SENT’G REP. 96, 98 (2015).
326. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, The Failure of Parole: Rethinking the Role of the State in Reentry,
41 N.M. L. REV. 421, 455-56 (2011).
327. Aaron Rappaport, The Institutional Design of Punishment, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 913, 949-50 (2018).
328. Rhine, Petersilia & Reitz, supra note 325, at 98.
329. See Rhine, Petersilia & Reitz, supra note 324, at 299-301 (citing “[a] recent survey [that] found
that 88 percent of paroling authorities report using an actuarial risk prediction instrument to guide decision
making.”); Scott-Hayward, supra note 326, at 456 (asserting that the “general approach of implementing
evidence-based practices in parole is increasingly popular among states and early results show promise.”).
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on modern theological thinkers.330 Brother Ebner was lanky, eccentric, and
fastidious, a friend of his told me.331 He was extremely learned, and he lectured
on theology for most of his life, but with his students, he returned to one particular
phrase frequently enough that he was remembered for it. It was this: “I don’t have
the answers, just the questions.”332
That’s the best I can hope for here, as well. But the questions I have are
worth asking. They are questions which consider the nature of mercy.
I employ the term “mercy seat” in the heading to this section and in the title
of this essay as a referent to the Greek term hilasterion found, inter alia, in Paul’s
Letter to the Romans:
[All] are now made just as a gift of grace through deliverance in
Jesus Messiah, whom God put forward as a hilasterion through
the faithfulness [shown] in his blood, to be a public proof of
justice[.]333
Most scholars translate hilasterion as expiation, propitiation, or “sacrifice of
atonement.”334 But some translate it as the mercy seat, a physical place where
something critically important happens at a particular moment in time.335 It can
330. See JAMES H. EBNER, GOD PRESENT AS MYSTERY: A SEARCH FOR PERSONAL MEANING ON
CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY (St. Mary’s College Press1976) (discussing modern theological thinkers).
331. Teleconference Interview with Brother Robert Smith (Ph.D.), Senior Vice President at St. Mary’s
(Nov. 25, 2019).
332. Id.
333. DOUGLAS HARINK, RESURRECTING JUSTICE: READING ROMANS FOR THE LIFE OF THE WORLD
33 (InterVarsity Press 2020) (quoting the author’s translation of Romans 3:24-25).
334. Id.
335. Compare 1 Chronicles 28:11 (DRA) (“the house of the mercy seat”), with 1 Chronicles 28:11
(CEB) (“the room for the cover”), 1 Chronicles 28:11 (CJB) (“the place for the ark-cover”), 1 Chronicles
28:11 (EHV) (“the chamber for the atonement seat”), 1 Chronicles 28:11 (GNT) (“the Most Holy Place,
where sins are forgiven”), 1 Chronicles 28:11 (JUB) (“the seat of reconciliation”), 1 Chronicles 28:11
(LEB) (“the house of the lid of the ark”), 1 Chronicles 28:11 (NOG) (“the room for the throne of mercy”);
1 Chronicles 28:11 (MSG) (“the Chest of the Covenant of God – the cherubim throne”), 1 Chronicles
28:11 (NASB) (“the room for the atoning cover”), 1 Chronicles 28:11 (NCV) (“the place where the
people’s sins were removed”), and 1 Chronicles 28:11 (WYC) (“the house of propitiation, or of mercy
doing, that is, of the holy of holy things, where the propitiatory was”). Court opinions rarely—though
occasionally—make reference to the mercy seat, by my count two in the eighteenth century, one in the
nineteenth, and none thus far in the twentieth. First, there is Alabama’s Judge Cates who once
characterized the American jury—properly operating—as the mercy seat:
The Common Law devised juries to make individual distinctions. The jury is an ad
hoc quasi-legislative body to fill in the lacunae of the law. It can tell an errant
miscreant to go and sin no more. It often finds lesser degrees of guilt than the outward
facts show. In short it is the great Mercy Seat of justice.
Ex parte Clifton, 262 So.2d 626, 629-30 (Ala. Crim. App. 1972) (Cates, J., concurring). Second, in a
response to New York Governor DeWitt Clinton, the jurist Ogden Edwards twice makes reference to the
mercy seat in the context of a discussion of executive clemency. Miller’s Case, 9 Cow. 730 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1827). Third, in a decision of the United States Supreme Court (issued decades before the enactment
of the Fourteenth Amendment), a New Orleans ordinance prohibiting Catholic priests from exposing
corpses as part of a funeral mass was challenged. Permoli v. Mun. No. 1 of City of New Orleans, 44 U.S.
589, 590 (1845). The ordinance required that the corpse instead “be brought to the obituary chapel,
situated in Rampart street . . . .” Id. Part of the petitioner’s argument (a losing, though impressively
learned argument) was framed as follows:
What is this function he is forbidden to exercise? His church—the holy Catholic
church—teaches that the mercy of God, while it mitigates, does not merge his justice;
that, though many, through the atoning blood of the Saviour, escape eternal woe, they
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signify the top of the ark in the Jewish tabernacle where the blood of a sacrificed
goat or lamb would be sprinkled in order to purify the community—this place is
not the sacrificed animal, nor the altar, mind you, but the lid of the ark.336 It is
that which opens up to reveal something else. I think this is an appropriate image
for undertaking an assessment of the location of mercy.337
Mercy is an imprecise term, but the image of a lid at least gives it
concreteness. In one sense, mercy means charity toward any person in need. We
treat a man without a coat with mercy when we give him our own.338 We exhibit
mercy when we help the poor, the downcast, the widowed, and the orphaned.339
do not all pass directly from this probationary state to celestial bliss. Souls may depart
this life unpolluted with mortal sin, which would consign them to everlasting misery,
and yet bearing some stains of earth, which may not be admitted to His presence,
before whose awful purity archangels veil their faces; and such, according to the
fearful parable, are cast into that prison whence there is no egress till ‘payment of the
uttermost farthing;’ till expiation of ‘every idle word,’ of which we are to ‘give
account.’ This expiatory state is termed by theologians, ‘purgatory;’ and the Catholic
doctrine is, that those who suffer there are aided by the prayers, almsdeeds, and other
good works of their brethren still in the flesh, and the suffrages of the blessed spirits;
exhibiting thus, blended in one tender ‘communion of saints,’ the church triumphant
in heaven, the church militant on earth, and her suffering members in the middle state.
Thus, Catholic charity ceases not with the last and offices rendered to these fainting
frames. When eyes that beamed on us with kindness are closed for ever, when the
intellectual light that blazed about and guided us is darkened, when the hearts that
loved and trusted us are cold and stil [sic], then are we stimulated to new
demonstrations of affection, by the very agony of our bereavement. And the church,
whose every precept is founded on the deepest philosophy of human nature, knowing
that the efficacy of prayer is proportioned to its urgency, (as her divine master ‘in his
agony prayed the more,’) directs that they shall be offered under every circumstance
that can animate hope, strengthen faith, or kindle charity. And, therefore, to her
temples, where she receives the little child at ‘the laver of regeneration,’ and where
she delights to bless the nuptial ring, she commands that we bring the bier; that,
kneeling beside the dear remains of friend or relative, before the awful memorials of
our redemption, surrounded by the relics of those who have gone before, and whom
we believe to be confirmed in glory, in the very presence of the mercy-seat, where,
less terrible but dearer than in the shekinah that filled the tabernacle of the early
dispensation, the Almighty shrouds his glory beneath the sacramental veil, we may
pour out our souls in fervent supplication, that those we mourn may be admitted to
the mansions of eternal rest, and have their longing hopes crowned with everlasting
fruition.
Id. at 598. There is also passing reference made to “the Mercy Seat Baptist Church” in an opinion from
the Missouri Court of Appeals, but it is in reference only to the name of a church, and not in reference to
the mercy seat invoked in these pages. Missouri v. Underwood, 530 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975).
336. DARRIN W. SNYDER BELOUSAK, ATONEMENT, JUSTICE AND PEACE: THE MESSAGE OF THE
CROSS AND THE MISSION OF THE CHURCH 245 (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 2012).
337. See also, e.g., Leviticus 16:2 (DRA) (quoting God’s commandment to “enter not at all into the
sanctuary, which is within the veil before the propitiatory, with which the ark is covered . . . .”).
338. See, e.g., Luke 3:11 (DRA) (stating “He that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath
none . . . .”).
339. For example, the Catechism of the Catholic Church provides:
The works of mercy are charitable actions by which we come to the aid of our neighbor
in his spiritual and bodily necessities. Instructing, advising, consoling, comforting
are spiritual works of mercy, as are forgiving and bearing wrongs patiently. The
corporal works of mercy consist especially in feeding the hungry, sheltering the
homeless, clothing the naked, visiting the sick and imprisoned, and burying the dead.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 588 (2d ed. 1994) (no. 2447).
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In this sense, mercy is generosity of spirit, self-sacrifice, and love for our friends,
neighbors, and even our enemies. That is the sort of place that it is. It is, I suppose,
a softening of the heart toward another.340 It is an active, affective state expressed
toward Debra. It is similarly directed toward poor, murdered Abby. It is more
than a state or a feeling; it is a certain kind of action that seems to derive from that
which is beneath a sacred hinge or a lid.
2. Opening the Lid
So, mercy as a lid. That is at least an image that makes mercy more tangible.
But it is insufficient to resolve the primary dilemma of mercy—whether it is
opposed to justice; whether it is a dilution of a legally correct punishment. I am
going to attempt to assert here something I cannot quite grasp; that mercy “is a
way of applying the law”—not opposing it.341 Not diluting it. But fulfilling it.
Completing it.
Gerald J. Bednar explains:
Although aware of abstract principles, mercy attends primarily to
concrete circumstances. There is no law of mercy in the statutory
sense of the term. No recipe exists for when and how it should be
applied. Mercy subsists in a different realm. Mercy resists
concrete circumstances that need individual assessment. Mercy
resists legal formulation. Nor is mercy an alternative to law.
Mercy is rather a way of applying rules and laws. Jurisprudence
that attends only to abstract principles or rules, therefore, can
result in a mean-spirited application of the law.342
Now, nothing in South Dakota Codified Law section 24-13-7 commands the
parole board to include a dose of mercy in their deliberations concerning a
prisoner’s application for discretionary parole.343 Nor does any statutory text
impose on them an obligation to love the prisoner. Indeed, were you to poll the
members of the South Dakota Board of Pardons and Paroles immediately after
voting on the release of any given prisoner, asking them each, “Do you love the
prisoner?” or “Do you love the victim?” I would predict that they would rather
340. See Dives in Misericordia, supra note 9 (construing mercy). Pope John Paul II writes that mercy
is essentially convertible with love:
Jesus revealed that love is present in the world in which we live - an effective love, a
love that addresses itself to man and embraces everything that makes up his humanity.
This love makes itself particularly noticed in contact with suffering, injustice and
poverty - in contact with the whole historical ““human condition,” which in various
ways manifests man’s limitation and frailty, both physical and moral. It is precisely
the mode and sphere in which love manifests itself that in biblical language is called
“mercy.”
Id.
341. See GERALD J. BEDNAR, MERCY AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF
AMORIS LAETITIA 2 (2021) (e-book) (describing that the Catholic Church applies a set of rules and laws
through mercy).
342. Id. at 51.
343. See SDCL § 24-13-7 (disclosing the standards for granting or denying parole).
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sensibly and unanimously reply in the negative. Yet, we are commanded by divine
law to do just that—to not only forgive, dignify, and mete out mercy, but, indeed,
to love the convict.344 Mercy is absent from a legal text like South Dakota
Codified Law section 24-13-7, Bednar insists, because mercy does not even exist
in a statutory sense.345 Mercy is not at loggerheads with either justice or law.
Indeed, without mercy, justice cannot be fully achieved. “Mercy,” Bednar
explains, “is the sensibility with Christians interpret the sense of the law.”346
Mercy might “produce a hug and sometimes a kick in the pants,” depending on
the circumstances.347 Love might require greater liberality, elevated strictness, or
something else. But love is, in any case, indispensable to the proper functioning
of any law. Love is the means by which a legal text can be applied to a human
being. Without it, there can be no justice.
Is this outrageous? William Temple, former Archbishop of Canterbury, for
one, does not think so. Temple says: “It is axiomatic that love should be the
dominant Christian impulse and that justice is the primary form of love in social
organization.”348 Those who live their professional lives in the criminal justice
system seem, therefore, even more called upon to love by virtue of their role in
the courts of law and the administration of justice. Ought we to query about their
love? Ought we then to swear in jurors by requiring them to take an oath to love
the victim and the accused? Ought we to debrief our litigants by asking whether
they loved their opponents? It is hard enough to love one’s own clients, let alone
the ruthless, single-minded adversary squaring off against us from the second
counsel table. Or her client.
With Debra, if we are to speak about mercy, it is in a very particular sense as
applied to her and her concrete circumstances. It is related to the question of
calibrating punishment. Her release should not follow because she had been—
and was being—imprisoned unjustly. She had been imprisoned justly, I believe,
up to the point of her release.
By justice here, I mean “primarily in terms of retributions and punishments
for transgressions and crimes committed.”349 I, for one, will not shirk retribution
as a legitimate justification for punishment.350 But I also mean procedural
fairness—impartiality—as well as a kind of truth being reflected in the verdict; an
344. See Hebrews 13:3 (DLNT) (stating “Remember the prisoners, as-though having been
imprisoned-with them . . . .“); Matthew 25:36 (DRA) (noting “I was in prison, and you came to me”);
Matthew 25:45 (DRA) (quoting “I say to you, as long as you did it not to one of these least, neither did
you do it to me.”); see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, The Justice of Retribution, 2016 HEDGEHOG REV. 101, 103
(asserting that if individuals “are committed to the values of love and forgiveness, punishments far less
than the wrongdoers actually deserve as a matter of justice.”).
345. BEDNAR, supra note 341, at 52.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. See LORD DENNING, THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON LAW 30 (Canadian Institute for Law,
Theology, and Public Policy, Inc. 1997) (quoting Temple).
349. HARINK, supra note 333, at ix.
350. But see JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN: FORGIVENESS AND ITS LIMITS 42 (2003) (offering
that retribution as a justification for punishment “is perhaps little more than a metaphor left over from old
theological notions of cosmic or divine justice . . . .”).
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assessment of guilt that corresponds to reality.351 Mercy demands charity as well
as nuance. Perhaps we could even say that doing the work of a lawyer—thinking,
as we often say, as a lawyer—means thoughtful interpretation, particularized
consideration, and delicate application of the legal text to human beings by means
of active mercy. If Bednar and Temple are correct, this is the only way in which
a lawyer should allow herself to think, to do, to speak, to listen—and to practice
law. For lawyers especially, the lid must be opened and remain so, even when we
are afraid, ambitious, or aghast at the deed which confronts us.
Debra received a fair trial in which participated counsel of the highest caliber,
overseen by a seasoned judge of undiluted integrity,352 a trial, I have no reason to
doubt, decided by a jury of fair-minded men and women. More, the outcome—
guilty of second-degree murder—was correct in that she did, in fact, commit
murder. Justice, in that sense, was done and therefore was being served by Debra’s
continued incarceration because her punishment was true. It was correctly arrived
at. Therefore, it was procedurally justified. In fact, in my view, it was also
substantively just. It was carefully calibrated to her crime. Her release—when it
was granted last September—was based on a fresh assessment and judgment that
she had—at that point; at that particular point in space and time—been punished
enough. The immense difficulty in arriving at this judgment—that this human
being has now been punished enough for this criminal act—cannot be understated.
It is a staggering idea that we might even be fit to engage in this sort of assessment;
to judge another; to pass judgment; to calibrate a term of imprisonment. It seems
to require of us that we judge others as God judges us, with divine mercy. But
how?
How? How is it, exactly, that we apply mercy if not to simply curtail a
sentence or to accelerate a release? I cannot say, exactly. Perhaps mercy
transcends both the argument for a lesser punishment and a call for a more severe
one; perhaps it even transcends justice. But I think it is closer to the truth to say
that it completes justice. Medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas says that “mercy
does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof.”353 As for me, mercy
remains obscure. But even if I cannot quite grasp its quiddity, I can nevertheless
assert its necessity. I can call out to it. I can pursue it. Mercy is something that
allows us to actually apply an impersonal legal text upon an individual person,
though just how we are to do that, I am unable to say.354 But I will continue to
ask “how?” in spite of its seemingly impenetrable mystery. It seems to me to be
a light worth following.
As the uncle I never met used to say, “I don’t have the answers, just the
questions.”

351. See Psalms 82:2 (DRA) (equating injustice with partiality).
352. Retired Judge Martin was gracious and generous enough to discuss the Jenner case with me and
respond to an earlier draft of this paper with many thoughtful, pointed, and well-placed criticisms, some
of which I have attempted to address and others which I have been unable to.
353. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I q. 21 a. 3 (Beniger Bros. ed. 1947).
354. See BEDNAR, supra note 341, at 62 (stating: “Only people can extend mercy; laws cannot.”).
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Some scholars have argued that a parole board should never reevaluate a
sentence grounded in proportional punishment; instead, a “parole board should
ask whether a prison stay beyond the date of first release eligibility is necessary to
serve the goal of public protection.”355 They assert that the only ground for
denying parole should be credible evidence that the inmate presents a significant
risk of offending if she is released.356 There is some sense in removing from the
parole board the task of re-weighing what represents a just punishment for a
crime.357 “In most states today, parole boards have effective authority to
reevaluate any and all aspects of the judge’s original sentence, including how
much time a prisoner deserves to spend in prison for his offense and his criminal
record.”358 There seems little sense in re-examining the trial judge’s calibration
of a measured, proportionate, and individuated sentence which typically involved
significantly more evidence and a much more searching inquiry into the nature
and circumstances of the crime than can take place during a parole hearing. An
expectation that the parole board should continually re-assess and redetermine the
fitness of a sentence can be reasonably called into question.359 The severity of the
crime remains a statutory factor, but, under South Dakota law, only one of fifteen
factors.360 The parole board has a much greater ability to assess the applicant’s
performance in prison than it does to retry the defendant for the crime or crimes
committed, and so, it seems, much greater emphasis should be placed on the
former. But the severity of the crime must still, somehow, be measured. And remeasured—re-judged—with each new parole hearing; again and again; for as
many times as it takes to reach a decision to release the prisoner under supervision,
to arrive at the statutory point in time of mandatory release without supervision,
or to reach the point of the prisoner’s natural death. The cycle of judgment and
re-judgment must continue until it ceases.
I do not endorse the idea of doing away with a crime’s severity as a legitimate
factor in discretionary parole decisions. Ignoring it would have been especially
inapt in Debra’s case, given that the only reason she was even permitted to apply

355. Rhine, Petersilia & Reitz, supra note 324, at 297.
356. Id. One could frame the assertion with the presumption reversed just as well (and indeed better)
thusly: A parole board should deny parole unless it is clearly persuaded that public safety is not impaired.
357. Here, things are admittedly complicated by the first true/correct/just sentence pronounced by
Judge Martin and the second also (at least in my view) true/correct/just commutation of that sentence by
Janklow. Some see Janklow’s commutation as having undermined Judge Martin. I do not see things that
way. While it is correct to say that one sentence cannot be different from another one as applied to the
same defendant at the same time and in the same circumstances unless at least one of them is unjust, Judge
Martin and Janklow made decisions separated by more than a decade. More, they made different kinds of
decisions, substantively and procedurally, from one another, and in different roles as state actors. And so,
I do think it is possible for them both to have been correct—and just. I do in fact see them both as prudent
jurists.
358. Rhine, Petersilia & Reitz, supra note 324, at 298.
359. See id. (noting that “we have no standards to guide” the manner in which “discretion over lengths
of prison terms should be apportioned between judges and parole boards.”).
360. SDCL § 24-13-7(3). See generally Bernard Connaughton, Parole Reform Must Happen, 89
CATH. WORKER 1 (2021) (complaining of parole boards that deny “parole based on one, unchangeable
factor – the nature of a person’s crime – and not a person’s age, many accomplishments in prison, personal
transformation or network of support.”).
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for parole in the first place was because Janklow commuted her sentence in 2002,
the effect of which was to make her immediately eligible for parole. The key word
here is “eligible.” Janklow clearly did not contemplate that her parole would be
granted more or less automatically without a multi-pronged assessment by the
Board of Pardons and Paroles; otherwise, he would have simply commuted her
sentence to the degree necessary to permit her to retroactively “flat” her sentence,
so long as she was in compliance with her institutional rehabilitation plan. Or,
Janklow might have simply pardoned her. He did not. His decision was more
measured than that, and it was to be given its due by virtue of the parole board not
simply handing Debra a “get out of jail free card.”
Still, if the only significant factor remaining for consideration in connection
with Debra’s ongoing applications for parole was a proportional sentence, it ought
to be recognized that the parole board has limited means at its disposal to
undertake a comprehensive assessment, at least relative to the kind of searching
analysis that a sentencing court or a Governor would have undertaken. Parole
hearings are rather truncated. The due process safeguards may also be diminished
by comparison to trial court safeguards, as underscored by Debra’s assertions of
board conflicts of interest. And so, the inherent limitations of the Parole Board,
relative to a Governor or a Circuit Court, in calibrating a judgment with precision,
ought not to go unremarked upon.
3. Peering Within It
But back to mercy. I have proposed the following tentative formula for
mercy in the context of Debra: It is the application of kindness and charity to the
prisoner—adhering to the recognition of Debra as a person—while re-assessing
the proposed punishment in the form of continued incarceration.361 “Punishment”
here is a potentially loaded term since we are knitting with a woven strand of
multiple objectives associated with imprisonment, including, for example,
rehabilitation.362 This formulation insists on an objective assessment of all the
relevant circumstances—including the community and the victim—while
maintaining a focus on Debra, the human being. The subjective and the objective
are not alternatives to one another. Christian teachings speak of a subjective
justice as “behaviour that is based on the will to recognize the other as a
person . . . .”363 It is not the sole criterion by which justice is implemented, but it
informs unceasingly any administration of a rule-bound or socially-situated
intersubjective analysis.364

361. See supra Part II(I) (framing mercy).
362. See supra text accompanying notes 349-352 (discussing justifications for punishment).
363. PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF
THE
CHURCH,
201
(June
29,
2004),
https://www.antoniano.org/carbajo/FST/Readings/Magisterium/EN_Compendium_CST.pdf.
364. Id. “[Justice] . . . from an objective point of view, constitutes the decisive criteria of morality in
the intersubjective and social sphere.” Id.
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The effort to recognize the prisoner as a person must be embedded in any
objective implementation of the rule of law, including measuring out a bit of
retribution; fitting the sentence to the crime.365 We must always be merciful, but
mercy is not simply another word for tenderness, nor any ruling in the prisoner’s
favor, nor any decision with which the State’s Attorney is disappointed. Nor is it
merely restraint. Instead, it is a virtue that we can never abandon. It is a cloak we
constantly patch and never shed. It is a place we need to continually visit. It is a
lid that must be tirelessly re-opened. It does not guarantee a particular outcome.
Yet its role is essential. At its core, it is love.
This is troubling, I think. But mercy can be troubling.366 When the prisoner
pleads for mercy, she does so in the context of praying for a particular outcome; it
is true. When one “throws herself on the mercy of the court,” it implies the hope
for leniency, not love. She asks for less punishment. She desires freedom. She
is underscoring her preference for a sentence of less rather than more, a preference
opposed by the state. This does not mean that only one side has a reservoir of
mercy to draw upon or call down. Both the prosecutor and the defendant must
embrace mercy equally, though their agendas are necessarily opposed. Both are
divinely commanded to be merciful to both offender and victim, difficult as it may
be.367
Perhaps when the prisoner pleads for mercy, she is asking for an
acknowledgment that the sentence will be imposed on her, a human being. She is
reminding the fact finder of this essential fact: that the law is confronting flesh,
her own. When the state embodies mercy, it acknowledges the defendant’s
humanity. And—commanded as we are to love one another—the defendant prays
that we love her, though not necessarily release her, while the prosecutor
reciprocates, though not necessarily with a position which the defendant joins.
Justice is not akin to manufacturing widgets of a certain style. Nor is it a tennis
match between advocates, each trying to score more points than the other. It is
about imposing justice on individual flesh and blood, men and women.
Mercy is this reminder—that the defendant is no less a person than the
defense attorney, the prosecutor, the bailiff, the court reporter, the judge, the
victim, and anyone else in the courtroom or outside of it. Mercy is an insistence
that we orient our decision-making toward the prisoner as a subject rather than as
an object; that we see the person who is the focus of the proceedings. That we
meet their gaze in pronouncing the decision and do so without meanness. That we
see her. Without unpleasantness. Without misplaced sympathy, either. Fairly.
Squarely. Lovingly. And authentically.
A rejoinder here is fair and equally just. It asks: “And what of the person of
Abby Lynn Jenner?” An advocate for her ought to claim the stage. Was not she
equally a subject who was treated as if she were an object and cruelly snuffed out
365. See also infra note 370 (discussing retribution).
366. “Mercy troubles the faint-hearted, because it requires mature judgment and discernment.”
BEDNAR, supra note 341, at 65. “It leads to ambiguity and uncertainty.” Id.
367. Indeed, it is probably not just difficult but nearly impossible. See Matthew 19:26 (DRA) (“With
men this is impossible: but with God all things are possible.”).
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of existence? Oftentimes, the victim of a crime will participate in the fact-finding
which underlies a parole application. Victim engagement can be critical, and
Abby, of course, cannot speak. (Studies do show that victims’ input can affect the
outcome of a parole hearing; mostly “in the direction of denial of release.”)368
Should not Abby’s sad fate be foremost in any consideration of Debra’s parole?
Does not the voiceless Abby deserve a voice?
Yes. A punishment ought to be meted out upon Abby’s killer. And, for more
than three decades of Debra’s legal life, it was by means of an initially perpetual
and later indefinite incarceration. Today it continues to be meted out insofar as
the conditions and constraints of her parole.369 It will be thereafter parceled out
in additional measures insofar as the felony conviction mars her record and
opportunities.
The question presented, rather, is how much more punishment ought to have
been added to it. When has Debra been punished enough? If she ought not to
have been paroled, then to what end would additional incarceration punishment
have served?370 Proportionality may suggest that she was past due for release on
368. Rhine, Petersilia & Reitz, supra note 324, at 281.
369. Debra will stay under the supervision of a parole agent until September of 2039, according to the
calculations of her counsel, Raleigh Hansman. E-Mail from Raleigh Hansman, counsel for Debra Jenner,
to author (Oct. 5, 2021, 13:13 CST) (on file with author).
370. See Richard Lowell Nygaard, Crime, Pain, and Punishment: A Skeptic’s View, 102 DICK. L.
REV. 355, 357-58 (1998) [hereinafter, Nygaard, Crime] (“Clearly, under the ‘crime equals punishment’
equation, severe punishment is called for [when the crime is severe]”). It is the wrongness of the crime
which generates a punishment; the more heinous the offense, the lengthier the prison term. This explains
the relationship between criminal conduct and prison sentence, but it fails to give a justification or a reason
for the punishment. Why does an especially callous criminal act produce an especially long jail term? A
functionality must be articulated. We cannot say: “Because that’s the way it is.” Generally speaking,
there have been only four reasons by which we justify punishment: (1) deterrence; (2) containment; (3)
rehabilitation; and (4) retribution. Id. at 361-63. See also CHARLES W. THOMAS, CORRECTIONS IN
AMERICA: PROBLEMS OF THE PAST AND PRESENT 36 (Sage Publ’ns 1987) (listing the three things “that
we seek to do or gain when we impose punishment” as (1) deterrence; (2) rehabilitation; and (3)
retribution). I will sidestep an analysis of whether containment is ever a legitimate goal of sentencing and
simply consider it as a justification and aim, legitimate or not. Deterrence and rehabilitation clearly have
legitimacy in general terms (though I am very skeptical of any claim that Debra needs to be indefinitely
incarcerated in order to deter other mothers from stabbing their three-year-olds). But does retribution have
any legitimate role? Third Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Lowell Nygaard answers this question
with a firm “No.” He claims:
Retribution is revenge plain and simple. We punish offenders who violate the law
because we are angry and want to get even. Retribution is about power. It is about
force. It is about repression. Under this theory, the offender’s violation of the law
legitimates our vengeful punishment and absolves us of any injustice or transgression
we may commit upon her because the offender deserves some suffering for violating
the social order. However, power creates the cruelty of indifference; force sacrifices
justice to achieve peace. And, any peace gained by these means is always an uneasy
one that is lost when the force of power is not present.
We rationalize punishment by various means. But when the penological
smoke clears, punishment is psychologically for the punisher. We like to punish, and
our rationale for doing so is really quite simple. The ugly truth is that we punish
because it makes us feel good to get even. I am opposed to any penological expression
of revenge.
Nygaard, Crime, supra note 370, at 363. See generally Richard Lowell Nygaard, On the Philosophy of
Sentencing: Or, Why Punish?, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 237 (1996) (outlining the development of criminal
sentencing from a philosophical standpoint); Matthew A. Pauley, The Jurisprudence of Crime and
Punishment from Plato to Hegel, 39 AM. J. OF JURIS. 97 (1994) (same). I think Judge Nygaard has either
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parole.371 Still, the horror of her crime is likely out of proportion with other
mothers who have killed their children. And perhaps other fathers who have. The
heinousness factor for Debra is very much off the charts. And the fact that Debra
wielded a toy airplane gives all of us the shivers.372 How do we calculate the
correct number of years? How can we possibly translate the inconceivable into
some slice of the integers which mark her lifespan? How do we arrive at a
number? My only answer is that we must scout for it with a lamp of mercy in
hand, and not simply convert her term-of-years sentence of imprisonment into a
life term by exasperation or inaction or inertia.373
too-narrowly construed retribution, too broadly construed rehabilitation, or else he has omitted an
additional justification for punishment. A woman who commits an unjustified, callous, intentional act of
harm against a helpless person, it seems to me, ought to receive some measure of punishment even if it is
convincingly demonstrated that (1) her punishment will have no deterrent effect upon other would-be
offenders; (2) there is no need to contain her to prevent additional crimes; and (3) the punishment will not
serve to rehabilitate her in in any way whatsoever. Take a twenty-five-year term of imprisonment, for
example, as a reasonable sentence. If we can find some agreement upon the justness of such a sentence
for such an act, even in the absence of (1) deterrence; (2) containment; or (3) rehabilitation, then perhaps
we have defined rehabilitation too narrowly. Perhaps receiving a just punishment is itself rehabilitative in
some way. It is a sort of participation in justice as a means to correct an injustice for which the defendant
is responsible. I do not mean rehabilitation in terms of the receipt of programming, education, and
enrichment within the prison walls, but simply by virtue of the punishment fitting the crime, the defendant
may be, in some measure, mended. A mending, I think, is not “revenge plain and simple.” Nygaard,
Crime, supra note 370, at 363. Or, alternatively, perhaps this sort of mending is not rehabilitation per se
but still contains some value for the defendant—and also, perhaps especially, for society—apart from
deterrence or containment. A sentence which fits the crime attempts to rebalance that which has been
unbalanced, disrupted, and mangled in the social fabric; a kind of re-stitching of that which the defendant
rent. See ETIENNE GILSON, THOMISM: THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS AQUINAS 306-07 (Laurence K.
Shook and Armand Mauer, trans., 2002) (claiming “there is nothing more to a sanction than the strict
observance of the law, the satisfaction found in order, and the realization of a perfect balance between acts
and their consequences.”). “The defendant, we demand, should participate in the correction. This “is not
to cancel the crime” because, after all, “what is once done can never be made undone.” WHITLEY R.P.
KAUFMAN, HONOR AND REVENGE: A THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 5 (2012) (citing Plato 1989, Laws, 934a)
(emphasis added). But it is to address it. Admittedly, though, this essentially amounts to a claim that
lengthy prison terms for heinous offenses “are good only because we cannot do without them,” CESARE
BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 13 (H. Paolucci, trans. 1963), and, as such, it is a flimsy one
indeed. It is like the worn-out parent who responds to a child’s insistent “why’s” with a snarly “Just
because!” Philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel dresses it up better when he says that we
presuppose that “punishment is inherently and actually just” by means of insisting that crime be annulled
or somehow reversed, “not because it is the producing of an evil, but because it is the infringement of the
right.” GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 70 (T.M. Knox, trans. 1942).
But it amounts to the same argument.
371. See S.D. Woman Who Killed Daughter Seeks Parole, SIOUX CITY J. (Apr. 20, 2005),
https://siouxcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/s-d-woman-who-killed-daughter-seeksparole/article_b7de1975-00ef-54dd-9759-6fa907d0bd63.html (quoting Debra’s attorney Ron J. Volesky
who said “that the average prison term for a woman who kills her child in South Dakota is 40 years, and
most of them are paroled in less than six years.”).
A Watertown woman who killed her 10-month-old son in 1987 by leaving him to
freeze to death in a shelterbelt was not released until her 12th parole hearing in 1999.
Pamela Ruml, who was 17 at the time of the death, was convicted of first-degree
manslaughter and given a 38-year prison term.
Id.
372. I take up the “toy airplane problem” infra at Part II(J)(2).
373. I will emphasize—and emphasize again—that this essay should not be read as suggesting that
the South Dakota Board of Pardons and Paroles has ever rejected Debra’s parole applications out of hand,
or without serious, searching, careful assessment. I am trying to insist, however, that we continue to do
so.
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It might be argued that retribution and proportionality (illuminated by Mercy)
are not the only considerations; that we ought to also map redemption. Can Debra
be redeemed? Or is she irredeemable? It seems to me that these are not the right
questions. They are questions for Debra and her final judge. No one is
irredeemable. We lack both the authority and the judicial machinery to redeem
others. It was not for the parole board to either grant or deny Debra a chance at
redemption. Redemption is not on this particular table. It is located elsewhere,
somewhere above.374
Rehabilitation, on the other hand, can fairly be considered.375 Could more
rehabilitation be expected from Debra? More than thirty years’ worth? Does the
ideal of punishment which claims that there is a medicinal quality to its effects,
indeed, demand more years from Debra?376 Might the prisoner be purified by
greater punishment?
The verdict of guilty was pronounced on Debra—and pronounced justly by
a jury of her peers in 1987. A just sentence followed—life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole. Then, that sentence was modified by the Governor.
There are some who feel that Janklow committed a serious error in commuting
Debra’s sentence to 100 years. They speculate that he did not have all of the
evidence in front of him; that he lacked, for example, Abby’s autopsy
photographs. And truly, although the frenzied act appears to have been as
unpremeditated as it was unexplainable, there seems to have been a space in the
narrative where Debra might have abandoned the toy airplane as an implement of
death and traded it for a knife. Surely there had not been a knife in Abby’s
bedroom, unless Debra initially entered Abby’s bedroom armed with a knife. How
do we weigh Debra’s trip from the bedroom—to the kitchen where the cutlery
presumably lay—and, having retrieved a knife, back again to Abby’s room? Was
there space enough for premeditation? This troubling blank space in the narrative
is not a sound enough reason for anyone to rest a conviction of first-degree murder
upon it.377 But it is a hole in the narrative that may have proved capable of
swallowing any chance of parole for Debra. Perhaps, some feel, Janklow never
374. At most, the courts may take pains to preserve the possibility of redemption. See Brainard v.
Francis, 2 Mart.(n.s.) 150 (La. 1824) (reasoning that a strict application of debtor imprisonment statutes
would render the debtor “truly a prisoner without hope; without any means or prospects of redemption.”).
375. SDCL § 24-13-7(12).
376. Thomas Aquinas construes punishment as medicinal:
Punishment is inflicted as a medicine that is corrective of the sin, and also to restore
right order violated by the sin. Punishment functions as a medicine inasmuch as fear
of punishment deters a man from sinning; that is, a person refrains from performing
an inordinate action, which would be pleasing to his will, lest he have to suffer what
is opposed to his will. Punishment also restores right order; by sinning, a man exceeds
the limits of the natural order, indulging his will more than is right. Hence a return
to the order of justice is effected by punishment, whereby some good is withdrawn
from the sinner’s will. As is quite clear, a suitable punishment is not assigned for the
sin unless the punishment is more galling to the will than the sin was attractive to it.
THOMAS AQUINAS, COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIAE ch. 121 (Cyril Vollert, trans.) (1947), available at
https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/Compendium.htm.
377. But see Appellee’s Brief, supra note 41, at 10 (quoting Debra as referring to Abby’s murder as a
“horrible premeditated act.”).
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considered the evidence that suggested this was not a spontaneous crime arising
out of snapped nerves, exhaustion, or a momentary loss of control.378
Or perhaps they feel that even with mercy properly deployed, a sentence of a
full century of incarceration is quite coherent for Debra. One may conclude
against parole without necessarily shortchanging mercy. These opinions, varied
as they are, if not equally true to the same degree, are at least proportionately
reasoned. They would withstand an appeal on a deferential standard of review.
They fall within the ordinary scope of discretion for an authoritative decisionmaker. But they risk missing the intersection where Debra was residing prior to
her release at the South Dakota Women’s Prison. The intersection is a crossroads
between continuing her incarceration indefinitely—perhaps for life, the sentence
that was originally imposed—and parole.
I would submit that it might also have been entirely just to continue to
incarcerate Debra, to continue to deny her parole. Her crime, insofar as
proportionality and due measure are concerned, could certainly justify
imprisonment for life.379 Her crime was originally calibrated, by a learned, wise,
and virtuous judge having before him all the relevant facts, to a life sentence
without the possibility of parole. His decision, at the point in space and time when
it was made, was, in his judgment (and mine), entirely just. Indeed, Judge Martin
could not have ruled otherwise, statutorily speaking, since her sentence was a
mandatory one. Moreover, even following Janklow’s intercession, as the statute
provides: “A prisoner is never entitled to parole.”380 Parole is always
discretionary. Therefore, a new set of mercy-embodied judgments was
contemplated. There was never any guarantee of Debra’s release on discretionary
parole.
“However, parole may be granted if in the judgment of the Board of Pardons
and Paroles granting a parole would be in the best interests of society and the
prisoner.”381 True, Janklow reshuffled the deck by insisting that her parole-ability
be considered—and regularly reconsidered, if it were not granted. The question
posed might be considered as a simple one—one of best interests. But it is far
from simple or easy. It must be one of a thoughtful assessment with many
important factors held together by mercy, that divine glue. For myself, after many
hours of reflection and analysis, I have not reached a conclusion. I do not know
how I would have voted in September of 2021—parole or nay? It is an enormously
difficult question. When I had the chance, at a different point in space and time, I
voted nay. I said no to her. So did the second individual on our two-person panel.
378. Janklow’s papers are kept at the University of South Dakota’s ID Weeks Library. Unfortunately,
although those files do contain numerous commutation consideration papers from the relevant time period,
none of them speak to the Debra commutation. Given that it was a very serious crime and a high-profile
case, I expect it may have merited its own banker box. Somehow, that banker box has gone missing.
379. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II q. 108 a. 2 (Benziger Bros. ed., 1947) (“the
virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with regard to all the
circumstances”) (emphasis added); see also Proverbs 13:24 (NIV) (“Whoever spares the rod hates their
children, but the one who loves their children is careful to discipline them.”).
380. SDCL § 24-15-1.1 (2013) (emphasis added).
381. Id. (emphasis added).
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At that point, in 2013, it was not yet time. But I did feel a warmth and a hope for
Debra upon receiving notification of her being granted parole in 2021, not
disappointment. I was glad for her.
I know from experience that the members of the South Dakota Board of
Pardons and Parole face a difficult task with each individual who appears before
them. All that I am prepared to advance is a suggestion—that the parole
determination be made carefully, thoughtfully, respectfully, and with a quantum
of mercy.382 And from all appearances, the decision to parole Debra last year was
undertaken in just such a manner. As were the numerous decisions to deny her
parole prior to that last hearing.
J. THREE FINAL POINTS: THE JENNER PROBLEMS
Three additional points remain. The first is the role of the span of years in
which Debra continued to insist on her innocence and in which she oversaw—or
at least implicitly condoned—a fundraising campaign to achieve her release,
falsely propounding a theory of an unidentified assailant. The second is what I’ll
call the “toy airplane problem.” The third—suggested by this essay’s title—are
the remarkably inconceivable aspects of her horrible crime. I address each
seriatim.
1. The Fundraising Factor
Retired Circuit Court Judge and former Attorney General Barnett adduced
that Debra’s incarceration hourglass did not even begin to clock her time until
February of 2003, when she first publicly admitted her guilt. He characterized
Debra’s innocence campaign as a “scam.” The latter is not unsupportable, but the
former goes too far. Fourteen years in prison should not count for naught. As a
matter of legal strategy, for Debra to have adhered to an actual innocence platform
when she was under a life sentence with no possibility ever for parole was sensible,
if dishonest.383 Debra’s substantial delay in admitting guilt was certainly a
relevant factor in assessing her eligibility for parole, but it is a factor that dimmed
with each passing year. Barnett’s arguments were once compelling. By 2021,
they carried much less force. By 2021, Debra had simply served significantly
more time behind bars.
Still, Debra’s long-running scam to finance her legal costs is a factor well
worth considering in weighing the prudence of paroling her. It is a blemish. And
a dark one. Considerations of the prisoner’s rehabilitation are sound, and Debra
could not be genuinely rehabilitated while she still wove falsehoods about her

382. This should not be interpreted as any slight against the Board of Pardons and Paroles, nor as a
suggestion that their decision making has been impartial, biased, or inadequate.
383. Amended Verified Complaint, Ex. 1, supra note 47, at 4.
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culpability in order to generate coin for more lawyers.384 Still, Debra was not
sentenced for her scam. And even if she had been convicted of a scam crime, the
typical sentence would not be measured in multiple decades.385 It is not
inappropriate to weigh Debra’s fundraising scam in the balance, but it is
inappropriate to deny her parole as a means to punish her for it.
2. The Toy Airplane Problem
The natural reaction to listening to the gruesome details of Abby’s murder is
to wince and recoil at Debra’s use of her son’s toy airplane in the attack upon her
daughter. This metal plaything seems at once deeply symbolic and extremely
troubling.386 It is a perversion—like a murderous clown, a fanged infant, or the
scene when Christine removes the Phantom’s mask to release an even more
grotesque mask.387 It is something from a horror movie. Our responses are not
universal; some respond to certain images or tropes more than others.388 But it is
undeniable that certain sorts of penetrative and primordial images get to us. The
black hairs sprouting from the center of Count Dracula’s palm makes our hair
stand on end.389 These sorts of images concentrate a response. They have the
effect of a slap in the face.390 They assault our sensibilities. They unbalance us.
384. I can criticize Debra’s fundraising without besmirching in any way the very fine lawyers who
have represented her with honor and zeal.
385. See Amended Verified Complaint, Ex. 1, supra note 47, at 3 (quoting Board of Pardons and
Paroles member Dennis Kaemingk addressing Debra in her February 2002 hearing: “Our concern now is,
you were trying to raise this money out there, and quite frankly, I think it borders on theft by deception.”).
In South Dakota, theft by deception is a recognized offense. SDCL § 22-30A-3 (2017). In Debra’s case,
assuming her misleading website campaign could be charged out as grand theft, that crime is classified as
a Class 4 felony if the amount in question was between $5,000 and $100,000. SDCL § 22-30A-17 (2017).
A Class 4 felony is punishable by up to ten years imprisonment. SDCL § 22-6-1(7).
386. Symbolic of what? I suppose the toy airplane can signify an inversion of the natural state of
affairs in a family home—in which a toy is intended for children and is meant for play. But here, an adult
wields it, and does so for a purpose as opposed to play as evil is opposed to good—as an implement of
maiming and death directed at an innocent child by the child’s parent.
387. See STEPHEN KING, IT (1986) (murderous clown); THE BROOD (New World Pictures 1979)
(killer kids); THE PHANTOM OF THE OPERA (Universal Pictures 1925) (unmasked foe); see also Joanne
Cantor, “I’ll Never Have a Clown in my House” – Why Movie Horror Lives On, 25 POETICS TODAY 283,
297 (2004) (observing: “Certain visual images, such as attacking animals and physical deformities,
automatically arouse fear”).
388. See Noam Meiri, Zeev Schnapp, Amichi Ankri, Itay Nahmias, Amnon Raviv, Omer WAgi,
Mohamad Hadad Saied, Muriel Konopnicki & Giora Pillar, Fear of Clowns in Hospitalized Children:
Prospective Experience, 187 EUROPEAN J. OF PEDIATRICS 269, 270 (2017) (calculating the incidence of
moderate and severe coulrophobia among children at 1.2%). I recently viewed the first GAMERA film and
found myself cringing at the unnaturalness of the monster—at once both ridiculous and unsettling—a giant
turtle which walks as a biped. GAMERA: THE GIANT MONSTER (Daiei 1965).
STOKER,
DRACULA
(chapter
2)
(1897),
available
at
389. BRAM
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/345/345-h/345-h.htm (“Strange to say, there were hairs in the centre of
the palm.”). See also Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929) (the “hairy hands” contracts case which,
as part of the typical 1L curriculum, also makes law students squirm).
390. See Matthew Hudson, Kerttu Seppala, Vesa Putkinen, Lihua Sun, Enrico Glerean, Tomi
Karjalainen, Henry K. Karlsson, Jussi Hiryonen & Lauri Nummenmaa, Dissociable neural systems for
unconditioned acute and sustained fear, 216 NEUROIMAGE 1, 2-3 (2020) (investigating “the neural
mechanisms involved in generating acute fear responses after threat onset and those supporting sustained
anticipatory fear when the threat is not yet present” in subjects viewing horror movies).
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Now, there are gradients of horror and ghastliness. I am not a criminal
lawyer. I live an insulated and generally bucolic life. Most of the dread I
encounter is of the fictional variety. There are tame comic books intended for ages
ten and under featuring ghosts. There are mildly frightening scenes in certain
Disney movies. There are the Goosebumps books, Creepypasta, and PG-13
slasher flicks. And then there are horror films like It and torture epics like Saw,
which are so over-the-top that they are unwatchable; sick; appalling;
nauseating.391 But I am not talking here about the level of gore, but rather “tricks”
that narrators can employ to amp up an emotional response. The toy airplane in
Debra’s hand functions in this way. It is outsized.
Within a narrative, certain imagined details pull on us with greater force than
others. A skilled novelist, a screenwriter, or a film director can use particular
details to great effect. A well-chosen detail can provoke a visceral reaction with
associated feelings of anxiety, fear, disgust, and discomfort. In the parole hearing
context, emotions are not irrelevant, and the typical visceral response to the toy
airplane element of Debra’s act is authentic. Still, an emotional response has the
possibility of overloading the decision-maker, overwhelming reason and
judgment, or, at a minimum, resulting in a particular detail playing an outsized
role in assessing the gravity of the offense.
I am not suggesting that the toy airplane is a problem because it is fictional.
It is not made up, although it bears emphasis that the evidence was far from
conclusive that the toy airplane was actually wielded by Debra. The state, not
unreasonably, perceived the effect of the toy airplane and wove it directly into the
narrative. The state suggested that Debra entered Abby’s bedroom in the middle
of the night, “stepped on a toy airplane left on the floor and snapped.”392
I am not averring that the toy airplane is unimportant, nor that it should be
ignored or excluded as evidence. My point is that its ability to horrify us and even
make the re-imagined events of April 5, 1987, unwatchable—unviewable—is out
of proportion to its actual significance. The intensity of an attack on Abby is
relevant, but the gruesomeness of an event is not. True, a bullet to the chest is less
reprehensible than a death by torture.393 Both are cruel, but one is crueler than
the other. These are grim comparisons, but necessary ones. The emphasis on a
toy airplane implement, however, is outsized. Both the state and defense counsel

In addition to generating immediate survival responses, fear systems also modulate
vigilance in anticipation of threat caused by environmental cues, perceptual
uncertainty, and ambiguity that elicits a sustained fear prior to actual encountering of
threat . . . giv[ing] rise to subjective feelings of anxiety, tension, suspense, dread, or
foreboding . . . .
Id. at 2.
391. See infra note 400.
392. Steve Young, Would DNA Free Mom Convicted of Murder?, ARGUS LEADER, Aug. 6, 2000, at
1A, 4A.
393. Compare State v. Piper, 2006 SD 1, ¶¶ 89-96, 709 N.W.2d 783, 816-17 (upholding a death
sentence when a killing involved torture), with Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 422-33 (1980) (reversing
a death sentence where defendant killed his wife and his mother-in-law with a single shot each to the head,
reasoning that the murders did not reveal depravity because, inter alia, the victims died instantly).
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seem to have recognized it as such. We must caution ourselves against meting out
punishment in greater measure on account of an act’s emotional triggers.
3. Inconceivability
Not long ago, an obituary appeared for a World War II veteran in the Sioux
Falls Argus Leader. Lieutenant Colonel Wendel Hanson passed away on June 15,
2021. He was 101 years old and counted among his accomplishments his military
service as a B-25 combat pilot. In 1944, he was introduced to a teacher by the
name of Helen Brumbaugh at a high school where he was recruiting students to
enlist in the air force. They spoke in the hallway for only a few moments, but so
smitten was he that he was inspired to write her a letter asking for her hand in
marriage.
She mailed her curt reply promptly, writing: “I do not even know you well
enough to say no.”
Eventually, of course, the two married. Otherwise, it would not have been
mentioned in the obituary. But Helen Brumbaugh’s initial answer to Lieutenant
Colonel Hanson’s marriage proposal is the point I want to consider. Initially, she
refused to accept his proposal; she also declined to reject it, reasoning that she
lacked sufficient knowledge at that point in time to do either. Since she was
without ample sensory data and knowledge to form a judgment either way, she
declined to do so. Lacking the ability to conceive the rightness or the wrongness
of marrying “Wen” Hanson, she simply demurred. She deferred judgment.
Similarly, I consider the primary stumbling block in any evaluation of
Debra’s parole application to be the incomprehensibility of what took place in
Abby’s bedroom in the wee hours of that Sunday in 1987. In weighing the gravity
of any given offense in my mind, I find myself engaging in a sort of empathy. Not
empathy in the sense of forgiveness or even sympathy, really, but as a means by
which to better assess what the offender did, how they did it, and why. To come
to grips with it. To grasp it and come to terms with it in some way. To “get” it in
some way. To see the criminal event through the perpetrator’s eyes in order to
comprehend it.
With Debra’s frenzied attack, our imagination fails us. Our ability to
approach any sort of rough understanding of the event falls short.394 It is too dark.
Lacking even a rudimentary understanding, we can find ourselves responding in
the same way that Helen Brumbaugh did to her future husband’s initial proposal
and demurring. We do not even know enough about what Debra did to refuse her
parole—let alone grant it. We cannot grasp it. Indeed, perhaps Debra cannot
grasp precisely what happened, either.
If we again utilize the way that horror movies work in scaring us the most
with what is left unseen, this dovetails with the observation that the unknowability
of Abby’s woeful death gives it an additional veneer of horror. It is not what the
394. Debra has been quoted as commenting to her friends in the days after Abby’s murder “on a
spiritual warfare going on inside her.” Appellee’s Brief, supra note 41, at 13.
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film director shows us which most causes our hearts to race, but what remains
unseen. That which might lurk there; that is what causes an audience to panic. In
a sense, Debra’s offense is even more unsettling than a dark shape in the water or
a shadow in the closet that we cannot quite make out. With Debra’s offense, even
when we turn a bright lamp on the thing and examine the evidence—even if we
look directly at what it tells us, it remains a puzzle with all of the center pieces
missing. It might be visually observable, but it remains utterly incomprehensible.
Even when we look at it, we cannot see it. We stare at a void. It is not merely
unknown but unknowable. Thus, we demure for lack of knowledge. We give up.
And it is not merely that we cannot see it; it is that we do not want to see it.
Some fender benders cause drivers to slow down and gawk as they drive by. No
small number of onlookers even gawk at the nastier car crashes. But for most, we
turn away—both out of a sense of respect and an instinct of self-preservation.
There are some things we do not want to see; we may even contort ourselves to
avoid seeing an atrocity. We may contort a fair understanding of what happened.
We push the thing away and reconfigure it into something that it is not. We “buffer
our sensibilities from the brutality” of it.395 Those contortions can have the effect
of blurring our faculties; our lenses, judgment, and human reason, to the point of
misapprehending the event.396 If something is unspeakable, it can also be
unknowable, at least without engaging a disciplined attention to matters.397
I realize here that I seem to have fallen prey to a contradiction. In the last
section, I asserted that caution was necessary when it came to the toy airplane. I
claimed that our view of that detail could overcome our faculties of judgment
without the conscious exercise of restraint and focus. In a sense, I identified a
problem of “seeing too much.” In this section, I am complaining of seeing too
little—of “seeing nothing”—an empty space confronts us when we try to
reconstruct how Debra went from an evening of restaurant chatter and watching
Hoosiers to carving up her child. It is incomprehensible. It is beyond our ken,
and apparently, hers, too. But both problems must be addressed in order to identify
how problematic the decision to grant Debra parole really was and what it
involved: both the too-vivid and the too-obscure. We should at least be willing to
think deeply about her fate and not turn away from her, either on account of the
difficulty of seeing her offense—or on account of the squeamishness that its toovisible parts generate in us. Adhering to the precept of mercy requires this—to recenter our examination of Debra’s offense while not losing sight of her.
The erudite reader will notice that I have twice now fallen back on references
and comparisons to popular horror films in order to try to explain Debra’s
395. Roxane Gay, The Careless Language of Sexual Violence, in ROXANE GAY, BAD FEMINIST:
ESSAYS 130 (2014).
396. See id. at 128-36 (examining a journalist’s report of the gang rape of an eleven-year-old girl
which avoids seeing the victim and instead focuses on “how the men’s lives would be changed forever,
how the town is being ripped apart,” and so on).
397. This difficulty confronts both the defense attorney and the prosecutor, it seems, but in different
ways: the jury may be over-anxious to find the defendant to be the culprit so as to avoid further sifting of
reasonable doubt; the jury may also be too quick to conclude that some unidentified person other than the
defendant must be to blame.
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applications for discretionary parole.398 That is not out of animus toward Debra,
nor sarcasm, but because of a lack of analytical tools.399 I am sure that stalwart
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys do not relapse into the narratives of Saw
or It.400 But because I lack the professional rubrics and frameworks for the task,
those are the stories I retreat to. But as I do so, I want to strenuously resist
characterizing—as the films do—the offender as a monster, as a mask; as an
“other,” or as a bogeyman. I want to continue to insist, as I believe in my heart,
that Debra is no more a monster than I or any of us. That she is every bit a person
as anyone else. Her deed was black. Her heart is not.
Not long ago, my son turned twenty-two years of age. He demonstrates
wisdom far beyond his years, so I asked him what sort of sentence he thought
would be appropriate for a mother who stabbed her defenseless toddler to death in
the middle of the night. “How many years should she serve?” I asked him.
He replied briskly, “None at all.”
When I pressed him, he explained that the murder had to have been the
product of a mental illness. There was no other way to account for it. This turned
to a discussion of the M’Naughton rule, its justifications, and how it might be too
limited in some circumstances.401 I ventured my own theory that the insanity
defense might be replaced by an analogue to the insane delusion doctrine for
setting aside a decedent’s last will and testament, which simply asks: “Was the
bequest caused by the decedent’s insane delusion?”402 Could not we just as well
ask: “Was the crime caused by the defendant’s mental illness?” Which was truly
responsible, the defendant or the diseased parts of her psyche?403
While, initially, it might seem that those who insist that Debra should serve
out a term of imprisonment for the remainder of her natural life and those, like my
son, who believe that any term of imprisonment would be unwarranted are
examining the issue from opposed polarities, but, in fact, they could be operating
within the same obscurity—the inability to explain or understand how Debra could
have possibly done what she did. One explanation is that she herself did not—an
overpowering psychosis must be at fault. Or perhaps she has been wrongfully
convicted. It is simply incomprehensible to think otherwise. On the other hand,
it is Debra, more than anyone else, who sketched this incomprehensible deed. She
is the principal culprit and the cause. And so, is it not just to burden her with its
incomprehensibility?
398. See supra Part II(J)(2).
399. See New Jersey v. Williams, 243 A.3d 648, 661 (N.J. 2021) (holding that prosecutor’s summation
comparing defendant to the character of Jack Torrance in The Shining deprived the defendant of his right
to a fair trial); STEPHEN KING, THE SHINING (1977); THE SHINING (Warner Bros. 1980).
400. SAW (Lions Gate Films 2004); IT (Warner Bros. Pictures 2017).
401. SDCL §§ 22-1-2(20), 22-5-10 (2017), 23A-10-2 (2016); State v. Calin, 2005 SD 13, ¶ 6, 692
N.W.2d 537, 540-41.
402. Matter of Estate of Tank, 2020 SD 2, ¶¶ 27-32, 938 N.W.2d 449, 457-59.
403. I have considered this idea, but not adopted it. See Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.2d 144, 151-52 (7th
Cir. 1995) (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting) (overruled by Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 779 (7th
Cir. 2020)) (“It is wrongful to break the law [even] when the lawbreaker is flawed, weak, retarded,
unstable, ignorant, brutalized, or profoundly disadvantaged, rather than violent, vicious, or evil to the
core.”).
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We can imagine an unknown assailant with a kidnapping motive, but how
can we imagine a mother doing that to her child? Perhaps we cannot. There is
some attraction to an approach such as this: That the act is unfathomable, thus, we
can never truly assess it, and so, the assessment having been aborted, any further
consideration of the idea of parole should similarly be jettisoned. We simply
throw up our hands at the task.
I believe that both conclusions are unsound. My inability to comprehend
how a mother could murder her child is not a valid criterion for rejecting any
consideration of parole. The gravity of her act may be. The frenzy of it may merit
continued incarceration, as horrific, bizarre, and fleeting as that frenzy was. But
the limitations of my imagination or empathy ought not to be.404 Inconceivability
can explain the denial of parole, but it ought not to justify it. Nor require it.
In the case of Debra, the primary considerations connected to her applications
for discretionary parole were the gravity of her act, the authenticity of her
contrition, and the genuineness of her rehabilitation. Her parole plan, we can
assume, was as sound as they come. The danger she poses to the community—to
the extent that predictors can be relied upon—is minimal.405 Her disciplinary
record, spotless. She probably completed all the rehabilitative programming
available to her. An evidence-based approach to parole decisions yields about as
strong a computation as can be that she should be given a chance at parole. A
single hesitation remains. A single apprehension fixes itself. And it is what she
did to her daughter—that horrendous, inexplicable, opaque mania that ended
Abby’s life. Let us consider that while we continue to weigh the fate of an
ordinary woman in her sixties from Huron named Debra, who has now—at long
last—been granted parole.
III. CONCLUSION
When I myself had the opportunity to consider Debra’s fate as one of her
judges, the enormity of her crime seemed so weighty that it overcame other
considerations of release on parole. It overcame me. Being “hung up on” a single
factor—the enormity of the parole applicant’s crime—is not flatly inconsistent
with the statutes governing parole hearings.406 But if the assessment does not take
due account of the other statutory factors, it is an incomplete analysis.
404. Debra may be as uncomprehending of the genesis or cause of her offense as we are. In parole
hearings, she has made reference to sleeplessness and post-partum depression at the time of Abby’s
murders as contributing factors. Debra’s own uncertainty about how to explain or make some sort of sense
out of her offense may be a more valid objection to granting her parole. It suggests that she may not have
effectively processed it yet.
405. But see Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (noting
that “[i]n parole releases, like its siblings probation release and institution rehabilitation, few certainties
exist.”).
406. SDCL § 24-13-7. But see In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 564 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the
egregious circumstances of a criminal offense may not be the sole reason for denying parole). The
Lawrence Court, parsing California statutes, emphasized that current dangerousness of the applicant for
parole “is the fundamental and overriding question for the Board and the Governor.” In re Lawrence, 190
P.3d at 554. “[T]he facts of the commitment offense, the specific efforts of the inmate toward
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As I remember it, when I asked her to try to explain to me what had happened
to Abby, she averted her gaze from mine and simply shook her head. I
involuntarily responded to the gravity of her criminal act by mirroring her gesture.
I simply shook my head in utter disbelief. Her act in Abby’s bedroom silences us
and takes away our speech. It arguably even silences us away from release, even
when we decide her fate from the mercy seat. To deny Debra release on
discretionary parole can be just so long as we do not rest solely upon being
rendered dumb in the wake of her crime, so long as the decisions to deny her parole
are ones that take due account of mercy. Precisely how we go about locating the
mercy seat for Debra’s case is a question—among others—that I must leave
unresolved.407 I do, however, feel relief at the news of her release. I feel a
gladness. I am hopeful for her.
Debra’s act threatens to overwhelm our ability to recognize it or to grasp it.
It dumbs our intellects. It is beyond our imaginative powers to fathom. Its
meaning and its motive befuddle us completely. In that act, we are simply
pummeled with its senselessness, its utter sadness, and its absolute depravity. The
murder of young Abby is inexcusable and unexplainable. It is a kind of void, a
nothingness. I will not be proposing anything akin to forgiveness. Nor
condemnation. Nor discomfort with what could have continued: a lengthy and
indefinite imprisonment as a sentence for Debra’s crime. But I do want to insist
on continuing to contend with mercy’s place; a particular place; an occurrence,
and an event, which we participate in.
My point in this essay is a modest one: That the incomprehensibility of a
crime is not an absolute bar to parole. That an offense is unfathomable does not
mean that the applicant herself is. The horrific act did not apply for parole. A
dignified human being—Debra from Huron—applied for parole. I submit that
while the invocation of mercy is not another way of simply saying that parole
ought to have been granted. The invocation of mercy requires us to consider
Debra—the person—as a subject and not as an object—as we ponder whether,
taking due account of Abby’s bloody end, it was the right time for her mother to
be paroled.408
rehabilitation, and, importantly, the inmate’s attitude concerning his or her commission of the crime, as
well as the psychological assessments contained in the record—must, by statute, be considered and relied
upon” as well. Id. The California Supreme Court allowed that the callousness or cruelty of the crime may
be relevant. Id. at 548-49. “However, the aggravated nature of the crime does not in and of itself provide
some evidence of current dangerousness to the public . . . .” Id. at 555. Subsequent decisions have, for
the most part, either minimized or declined to follow Lawrence. E.g., Anselmo v. Bisbee, 396 P.3d 848,
851 (Nev. 2017) (distinguishing Lawrence based on statutory variations); see also Blaire Russell, Note, In
re Lawrence and Hayward V. Marshall: Reexamining the Due Process Protections of California Lifers
Seeking Parole, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 251, 260-65 (2009) (discussing Lawrence); Joey Hipolito, Note,
In re Lawrence: Preserving the Possibility of Parole for California Prisoners, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1887,
1897 (2009) (same).
407. We must judge her; we may reproach her; we must not reject her. Cf. JOHN PAUL II, CROSSING
THE THRESHOLD OF HOPE 7 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1994) (noting that Christ severely reproached Peter
but did not reject him) [hereinafter, JPII]; Mark 8:33 (DRA).
408. See Samuel J. Levine, Looking Beyond the Mercy/Justice Dichotomy: Reflections on the
Complementary Roles of Mercy and Justice in Jewish Law and Tradition, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 455,
470 (2006) (quoting ABRAHAM R. BESDIN, REFLECTIONS OF THE RAV: LESSONS IN JEWISH THOUGHT,
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Although I have taken the liberty of peppering this essay with Biblical
references and grounded a discussion of Debra in a Christian theological context,
a purely utilitarian cost/benefit question can also be framed. Independent of any
divine commandments, any rule-based morality, natural law, or even
sentimentality, those who argue that Debra should instead serve additional years
incarcerated in the South Dakota Women’s Prison ought to be able to articulate a
reason; that more good will come of it than bad. They ought to be able to articulate
why. Why should she stay behind bars until both of her parents have passed on?
To what end? Surely not punishment for its own sake; punishment as an end unto
itself. That is too circular. I know of no utilitarian who could track it.409
We can claim that Debra’s frightful crime merits her punishment continuing
indefinitely; that she does not “deserve” parole; that she does not “merit” it. We
can refuse to give her a reason other than that we desire it. If she asks why, we
can reply: “Just because.” Her crime still makes the mind reel. But having served
nearly three and one-half decades of her life behind bars for that terrible, terrible
crime, it seems now, to me, that no good would come of it if she had served more.
Something milder will do. Justice permits it. Mercy suggests it. Our law should
embrace it, in this place and at this moment in time. Now. Here.
Godspeed and God bless, Debra Sue Jenner. And rest in peace, Abby Lynn
Jenner.

ADAPTED FROM LECTURES BY RABBI JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK 57 (1981)) (“The principle of
[righteousness] demands that [justice] reflect the existential condition of [humans’] inevitable
imperfection.”).
409. There are precious few ends in themselves. But there are a few. Utilitarian philosophers like
John Stuart Mill would label human happiness as an end in itself. Thus, they are able to solve human
problems with a math which questions: “How much happiness?” It is a kind of unmoored capitalism—
what profit it? One surer end in itself is the human person. “[M]an, it is said, ‘is the only creature on earth
that God has wanted for his own sake.’” JPII, supra note 407, at 202 (quoting Gaudium et Spes 24 (1964)).
And that creature—that “person is realized through love.” Id.

